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Dr. Boulderlove; Or, How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love Local Antitrust Liability
Community Communications v. Boulder arose in the context of local
cable registration, but the decision raised the spectre of antitrust liability
for nearly any local regulatory activity. This comment reviews state legis-
lation enacted in response to Boulder against a framework of the post-
Boulder "Parker Doctrine" and its probable requirements.
INTRODUCTION
In all probability, few major problems were anticipated by the
Boulder, Colorado town council when it set out to find the "best"
cable service for its medium-sized college community. The goals
would be met with simple ordinances, with an eye toward tempo-
rary restraint of an existing cable system's growth. The plan
might well have worked in cable's younger, limited profit poten-
tial days. But cable was no longer a simple business. In contrast
to its early antenna substitute function,' the cable company had
become an independent programmer and supplier of services. 2
Thirty channels or more of two-way cable service were possible.3
The future seemed limitless; new cable programming services
1. Cable's predecessor amounted to a group antenna shared by neighbors.
Two or more families would pool their resources to erect an antenna tower tall
enough for fringe area reception, then share the signal.
The first commercial cable system was built in 1950 in Lansford, Pennsylvania, a
town shielded from available signals by terrain and limited by a Federal Commu-
nications Commission freeze on new stations. An enterprising citizen decided to
make the best of the situation. He erected an antenna tower atop one of the
mountains blocking Lansford's reception and distributed its signals by wire to the
town. The entrepreneur presumably made money, the citizens of Lansford joined
"the TV age" and a new communications technology was born. See generally, E.
FOSTER, UNDERSTANDING BROADCASTING 345-47 (1978). See also M. HAMBURG, ALL
ABOUT CABLE 5 (1979).
2. Initially, cable was merely a relay service, snagging local signals off the air
and later bringing distant signals in by wire and microwave. The first effort at a
sort of "original" programming appeared in Bartlesville, Oklahoma in 1957, when a
movie theater chain thought of the idea of sending movies directly to the home by
cable. The system was dubbed "Telemovie." THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF BROAD-
CASTING 138 (1982). The late 1970's brought economical satellite distribution and
an explosion of special cable services. See J. ROMAN, CABLEMANIA 57-101 (1983).
3. J. ROMAN, supra note 2, at 61. Two-way cable systems allow viewers to
"talk back." This facilitates everything from simple viewer surveys to videotext
systems.
were springing up right and left while cable system companies
fought vigorously for the right to supply cable service to towns
across the country.4 Elaborate promises were made to secure
franchises with the view that their company had a "blue sky" po-
tential for profit.
Not long after Boulder set out to get its super cable system,
dark clouds began forming in cable's blue sky. With so many new
program services competing for viewers, channel space and ad-
vertising, it became apparent that less than all would survive.
More importantly, cable companies were beginning to conclude
that the ever more extravagant demands of cities were too expen-
sive. Where an existing franchise was involved, confrontations
brewed as renewal time approached. 5
The Boulder cable franchise negotiations followed this path, the
ultimate result being the termination of the franchise in favor of a
local upstart company.6 The old franchisee sued. Boulder found
itself in court facing antitrust allegations and the vague complexi-
ties of the "Parker Doctrine" state action defense.7 Soon the
Supreme Court was involved and Community Communications
Company v. City of Boulder8 left its confusing stamp on antitrust
law.
This comment examines the impact of that stamp, by dividing
the analysis into three distinct parts that assume progressively
more involved knowledge of the issues at hand. First, the basic
provisions of the Sherman Act are examined. Second, the line of
cases dubbed the Parker Doctrine are examined in an effort to
draw a common thread through their underlying policy goals.
Third, the most current post-Boulder legislation by the states is
examined in light of selected case law and commentary. The
comment is thus a guide of sorts to living with Boulder.
4. This resulted from the industry's emergence from the quagmire of regula-
tion. E. FOSTER, supra note 1, at 364-67.
5. See J. ROMAN, supra note 2, at 141-48. See also Warner's Franchise
Problems Dominate Texas Cable Show, Broadcasting, Jan. 23, 1984, at 38.
6. For a factual discussion of the Boulder dispute, see infra notes 75-91 and
accompanying text.
7. In a sentence, the Parker Doctrine provides:
The sovereign conduct of the several states is not subject to the restric-
tions of the federal antitrust laws.
The application of this doctrine to state subdivisions was the issue in Boulder and
is the broad topic of this comment.
8. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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PART 1
The Sherman Antitrust Act
The goal of Congress in enacting the Sherman Antitrust Act9
was simple: to ensure a competitive economy.' 0 This goal was
achieved by making any agreement, tacit or otherwise, re-
straining trade illegal" and by likewise declaring illegal any use
of existing monopoly power, or any attempt or conspiracy to gain
monopoly power.' 2 Although the issue in Boulder focused not on
the City's actual liability for antitrust violations, but on the nature
of liability, a summary of the touchstone elements of the Sher-
man Act will be of value in understanding the impact of Boulder
and the legislation it inspired. Further, a working knowledge of
the Act allows an understanding of the following premise: "[I]t is
one thing to say that certain ... activities are not absolutely ex-
empt from the reach of the Sherman Act, but quite another to find
those activities violate the Act."' 3
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1983). The heart of the Sherman Act is found
in its first two sections which are set forth in pertinent detail infra at notes 11 and
12.
10. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-54
(1944). For a concise and very readable summary of the Sherman Act, see E. Krr-
NER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER (2d ed. 1973); J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS (8th ed. 1980) (including a summary of the common law roots of
modern statutes). For a critical review of the effectiveness of the Act, see R. Pos-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
11. Section one of the Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 &
Supp. 1983).
12. Section two states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. " 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1973 & Supp. 1983). Both sections one and two are enforceable by pri-
vate parties through a civil action to enjoin the conduct of any person or entity
violating the provisions, and make available treble damages. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1973
& Supp. 1983). See generally, 1 VON KALINOWSKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REG-
ULATION § 1.06, at 3-16 (Desk ed. 1982); 2 VON KALiNOWSKI, supra, §§ 8-9; E. KITNER,
supra note 10, at 150-58. In criminal proceedings, the elements set forth in sec-
tions one and two constitute specific intent. United States v. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422 (1978).
13. Driker & Shore, Community Communications v. Boulder - New Problems
for Municipalities: Antitrust Liability, 61 MICH. B.J. 426-32 (1982). It must be kept
in mind that a lack of immunity subjects cities to greater defense costs, for with-
out the blanket shield of the Parker Doctrine, it is unlikely that municipalities will
often be able to dispose of antitrust claims in a summary manner. See Poller v.
Columbia, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Report of the Governor's Task Force on Local Gov-
ernment Antitrust Liability 10-11 (Feb. 16, 1983).
1.1 Section One
Although the language of section one makes quite clear the re-
sult Congress sought to avoid, it provides no express delineation
of what conduct is prohibited. The section simply states that all
conduct in "restraint of trade" is illegal.14 Initially, the courts took
the language quite literally and some agreements that would have
been legal at common law were held to be a violation of the Act.' 5
This theory was premised in part upon the belief that Congress
had done more than simply codify the common law concerning re-
straint of trade and illegal combinations, so that the Sherman Act
would necessarily be more restrictive.' 6 The illusory question
seemed to be where to draw the new line of legality. As the Court
later observed, "[t]o bind, to restrain, is of [the] very essence" of
a contract.' 7 After a period during which it appeared that almost
any contract would violate the Act, the Court effectively reversed
itself in Addyston Pipe & Steel Company v. United States. 18 In
Addyston, the Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit's view
that a contract violated section one of the Sherman Act not sim-
ply because it restrained trade, but because it unreasonably re-
strained trade.19
This analysis was later adopted expressly in Standard Oil Com-
pany v. United States20 and has come to be known as the "Rule of
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1983). See E. KrrNER, supra note 10, at 15.
15. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896) (re-
jecting the assertion that section one outlawed only unreasonable restraints of
trade). See also National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (observing that "read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire
body of private contract law").
16. E. KrrNER, supra note 10, at 16.
17. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
18. 176 U.S. 211 (1899). The ill-fated agreement in Addyston involved a con-
tract for the sale of pipe. The Court found that it served no purpose but to re-
strain trade and that such agreements were of the type made illegal by the
Sherman Act. While the result reached in Addyston could have arisen just as well
from a strict reading of section one (as in Trans-Missouri), the rationale laid the
foundation for the express adoption of the "Rule of Reason" in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
19. 85 F. 271, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1899). "Contracts that were in unreasonable re-
straint of trade at common law ... were ... void, and were not enforced by the
courts. The effect of the Act of 1890 [the Sherman ActI is to render such contracts
unlawful. . . ." Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
20. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court followed Addyston in looking to the English
and American common law understanding of the term "restraint of trade" to eval-
uate its use in the Sherman Act. Id. at 51. The Court concluded that since Con-
gress gave no other explanation, its intent must have been that "in restraint of
trade" have a meaning similar to its usage at common law. 221 U.S. at 59. The dis-
sent argued that the "rule of reason" approach amounted to the same sort of judi-
cial meddling in private affairs that had been discarded with the decline of
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Reason." 2 1 The constant rehashing of certain patterns of restraint
feared by the dissent in Standard Oil has been avoided by judi-
cial recognition of certain conduct as unreasonable "per se." 22 To-
day, the per se rules stand alongside the Rule of Reason in setting
the standard of what sort of conduct amounts to a proscribed re-
straint of trade.23
That a restraint of trade be unreasonable is but one element of
a section one offense. There are three others:2 4
substantive due process. Id. at 82 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result but dissent-
ing as to the method of analysis).
21. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
687 (1978). "[Tlhe inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether the chal-
lenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses compe-
tition." Id. at 691. "[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favor-
ing competition is in the public interest .... [TIhat policy decision has been
made by Congress." Id. at 692. The current state of the Doctrine is discussed in E.
DISNER, THE RULE OF REASON: FUDGE FACTOR IN ANTITRUST LAW, L.A. Daily Jour-
nal Report, July 13, 1979 (reprinted in ANTITRUST: NEW DEVELOPMENTS 132, August
1982).
22. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958):
[T] here are certain agreements or practices which, because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or business ex-
cuse for their use. This principle ... avoids the necessity for an incredi-
bly complicated and prolonged economic investigation.
Id. at 5.
23. There are five basic types of conduct that are recognized as unreasonable
per se:
1. Price fixing; see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939);
1 VON KALiNOwsK, supra note 12, § 3.02[71 [a], at 3-20-21;
2. Tying arrangements, or those which make the availability of a service or
product contingent on the purchase of another or upon exclusive use; see 1 VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 3.02[7] [b] [i], at 3-27-28;
3. Horizontal and vertical boycotts (horizontal schemes involve the concerted
action of parties at one level of the marketing chain [all peanut wholesalers],
while vertical schemes involve the concerted effort of those at various levels of a
product/service marketing chain [a peanut grower, wholesaler, and retailer]);
see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945);
4. Horizontal division of markets; see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972), final judgment, 1973 Trade Cas. 74,391, amendment, 1973
Trade Cas. 1 74,485 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 414 U.S. 801 (1973); 1
VON KALiNOWSKI, supra note 12, § 3.02[7] [d], at 3-38;
5. Reciprocal dealing; see United States v. Griffith Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. If the Justice Department is bringing a criminal action, the four elements
are joined by a fifth: criminal intent. See supra note 12.
1. two persons must act in concert,25
2. this conduct must be for the purpose or have the effect of
restraining trade or commerce,26 and;




Section two of the Sherman Act makes illegal the use of monop-
oly power or any attempts to gain monopoly power. While the
use of such power may involve acts in "restraint of trade," 28 all
such acts are not necessarily independently in restraint of trade.29
While section one prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, sec-
tion two prevents the use of restraints of trade that, although rea-
sonable, involve the improper furtherance or attempted creation
of monopoly power.30 Specifically, section two enumerates three
separate offenses: (1) actual monopolization, (2) attempts to
monpolize, and (3) combinations and conspiracies with monopoli-
zation as a goal. As with section one, the courts have developed a
set of criteria delineating the elements of these offenses.
A case of actual monopolization is made out by showing that
25. 1 VON KALimowsKi, supra note 12, § 3.02 [ 1 ], at 3-5. In the Boulder litigation,
the city is assumed to have acted in concert with some new entrant into the cable
market. However, this theory was rejected by the trial court. 485 F. Supp. 1035,
1038.
26. 1 VON KA,.NOWSI, supra note 12, § 3.02[4], at 313-15. However, some ex-
ceptions may apply, as was the central issue litigated in Boulder. For a quick sur-
vey of the remaining exceptions (express and implied), see J. VAN CISE, THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 7, 55-56 (4th rev. ed. 1982).
27. The plain meaning of the statute's language makes this clear. See 1 VON
KAuNOWSIu, supra note 12, § 1.02 [ 11, at 1-9. The scope of activity defined as inter-
state in nature has expanded dramatically since the Sherman Act was passed into
law, the coverage of the Act expanding as well. E. KrrNER, supra note 10, at 18-19.
The operation of a cable television system has been expressly held to effect inter-
state commerce. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69
(1968).
28. See Standard Oi 221 U.S. at 61.
29. Id.
In other words, having by the first section forbidden all means of mono-
polizing trade ... the second section seeks ... to make the prohibitions
of the act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to
reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by
any attempt to monopolize ... even although the acts by which such re-
sults are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not em-
braced within the general enumeration of the first section.
See also supra note 20.
30. 1 VON KAuuowslu, supra note 12, § 1.02[21 nn. 20-23, at 1-11 and accompa-
nying text. The section reflects the intent of the Congress to include all anti-com-
petitive activity within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. See also United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) reh'g denied, 334 U.S. 862; 1 VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 3.0311] [c], at 3-52.
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the defendant possesses monopoly power 3' in the relevant mar-
ket 32 and that the defendant intends to use, or has used, that
power.33 There is nothing inherently wrong with the possession of
monopoly power. Illegality attaches only to its misuse. In con-
trast, the two remaining offenses involve situations where monop-
oly power is yet to exist, but is actively sought. An attempt to
monopolize consists of the specific intent to destroy competition
31. Looking to case law from all of the federal courts, von Kalinowski has for-
mulated a three-step analysis for determining whether a defendant has monopoly
power.
1. Has defendant used his market position to raise prices or exclude
competition? If so, defendant clearly has monopoly power. If not:
2. How much of the market does defendant control? If less than 50%,
there is no monopoly. If more than around 80%, it is "virtually certain"
there is a monopoly. If defendant controls between 50% and 80%:
3. Considering defendant's market share and one or more of these fac-
tors:
(1) market or industrial structure;
(2) business policies and conduct of defendant and
(3) defendant's business performance.
It should be clear that the outcome in the 50 to 80 percent range is far from cer-
tain. 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 12, § 3.03[21 [c] [iii], at 3-67-72.
32. United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). This element springs
from the section two language, "any part of the trade or commerce .... ." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1973 & Supp. 1983), and is the first step in analyzing the propriety of a
defendant's conduct. The identification of a relevant market has been held to turn
on what, if any, substitutes for the defendant's product or service are part of the
product market. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956). This involves a two point analysis, based on the product's fungibility and
the "cross-elasticity of demand." Id. This basically involves a study of how, if at
all, a slight decrease in the price of one of the products or services will effect the
two products' market shares. The more substantial the effect, the more likely the
products are to be found part of the same market.
Once the relevant product market is determined, the relevant geographic mar-
ket must be outlined. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation v.
International Business Machines Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979). This
market can vary in size from a small town to the entire nation. See 1 VON KALI-
NOWSKI, supra note 12, § 3.03[21 [bI [ii], at 3-61-63.
33. United States v. Grifflth, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). All that must be shown
for a finding of a general intent is that defendant acted unlawfully or engaged in
practices that furthered or maintained its monopoly. 16B VON KALINOWSKI, Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS: AN'ITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02 [41 at 8-44-48.1
Compare infra notes 34-38, for examples of a specific intent requirement. Von
Kahnowski notes that courts often infer the intent from the circumstances:
1. Where defendant achieved his monopoly power via unlawful acts;
2. Where power was achieved fairly, but maintained illegally;
3. Where power was lawfully attained and is maintained by otherwise legal
business policies that don't consist of continued product excellence.
Id. at 8-46-47. However, the mere possession of monopoly power does not consti-
tute a violation of section two. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
or build a monopoly3 4 coupled with a "dangerous probability" of
attaining monopoly power.35 A dangerous probability of success
exists if the defendant has so much market power that there ex-
ists a reasonable likelihood that he may gain monopoly power,36
and if he has engaged in overt conduct designed to reach his goal.
A conspiracy to monpolize consists of overt concerted action, the
specific intended result 37 of which is the acquisition of monopoly
power.38 For the reasons noted above, extensive discussion of the
elements of section two offenses is left to other sources.
With a basic understanding of what constitutes a violation of
the Sherman Act in hand, it is time to turn to the question of just
who is subject to the Act's proscriptions. Both sections one and
two provide that any person may be liable. 39 This clearly includes
corporations and associations,40 but to what extent, if at all, does
the Act apply to the conduct of a state government or its subdivi-
sions? The Supreme Court has struggled with this question since
it first directly addressed it in Parker v. Brown. 41
PART 2
The Parker Doctrine
Although the Court touched on the question of state antitrust
immunity before Parker, the issue was never squarely, much less
conclusively, addressed.42 In Parker, the issue was met head on
34. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). This
specific intent may be inferred from the practices of defendants. United States v.
Jerrold Electronic Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd per curiam, 365
U.S. 567 (1961); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). Where
the line between inferred specific intent and mere general intent lies is unclear.
16B VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 33, § 9.01[4) n.65 at 9-25 and accompanying text.
35. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 626; Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pa-
cific Tea Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 832 (1980).
36. There is some debate as to whether it is necessary to show that the "rea-
sonable chance of success" exists in a relevant market. The majority of circuits
seem to require that the relevant market be shown. 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note
12, § 3.04131,at 3-100-102.
37. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Spe-
cific intent may be inferred.
38. As is the case with attempted monopolization, the generally accepted view
is that the intended acquisition of monopoly power must be in the relevant mar-
ket. See United States v. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. 218 (1947); 1 VON KALNowsK, supra
note 12, § 3.05[41, at 3-116-120.
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. The antitrust laws were developed in reaction to the conduct of large cor-
porations. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 23-31. Likewise, the circum-
stances in which an association may find itself in antitrust trouble are numerous.
See generally 1 VON KALiNowslo, supra note 13, § 2.06, at 2-98-116.
41. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
42. The seeds of the doctrine may be found in Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332
(1904). There the Court considered a Texas law providing for a steamboat pilotage
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and has since been discussed at length in a series of inconsistent
decisions that constitute the "Parker Doctrine." Each of these de-
cisions is discussed in turn in an effort to draw a common thread
between them so that some workable standard for reviewing the
legislation enacted in response to Boulder may be developed.
2.1 Parker v. Brown
Parker began as a dispute between a raisin farmer and a Cali-
fornia state official over compliance with the California Agricul-
tural Prorate Act, which the farmer claimed illegally interfered
with interstate commerce.43 The question of antitrust liability
was not raised in the trial court and was addressed in the
Supreme Court only at the query of the justices.4 4
The challenged scheme was rather complex and involved action
by a state commission at the request of, and subject to the final
approval of, the farmers to be regulated. While the raisin farmer
met with success in the trial court, his victory was not on anti-
trust grounds. Rather, the trial court found that the program un-
reasonably interfered with interstate commerce.4 5
The Supreme Court rejected this holding, finding the policy of
the marketing program to be consistent with federal marketing
programs.46 More importantly, the Court found the program to be
valid under the Sherman Act.47 Simply stated, the Court held
monopoly. In dicta, the Court suggested that the "antitrust laws of Congress" did
not displace a state's authority to regulate matters of state concern. Id. at 344-45.
43. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
44. The Parker Court requested that counsel address the question of state an-
titrust liability in their briefs on re-argument in light of the Court's holding that
the State of Georgia was a "person" under § 7 of the Sherman Act and could there-
fore recover treble damages. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 587 (1976).
See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
45. The lower court held that the Act was an illegal interference with and un-
due burden upon interstate commerce. 39 F. Supp. 895, 902.
46. Farmer Brown pointed to the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937 as support for the trial court's conclusion that the California law vio-
lated the commerce clause. Parker, 317 U.S. at 349. The Parker Court observed
that while the federal Act envisioned regulation in the realm of the California Act,
no such federal regulation had been promulgated. Id. at 353-55. The federal act
discussed in Parker remains in force today. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624 (1980 & Supp.
1983).
47. The exact language the Court used in stating this conclusion is the basis of
the Parker Doctrine and therefore the basis of arguments concerning the Doc-
trine's nature and scope. Because succeeding decisions often cite the discussion
and because its exact impact is even today debated, it is set forth at length:
We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program
that the Act did not apply to action by a state. Since the conduct
involved in Parker was clearly that of a state (acting through an
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective
solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private per-
sons, individual or corporate. We may assume also, without deciding, that
Congress could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state
from maintaining a stabilization program like the present because of its
effect on interstate commerce. Occupation of a legislative "field" by Con-
gress in the exercise of a granted power is a familiar example of its consti-
tutional power to suspend state laws ...
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never intended to op-
erate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its au-
thority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was
not intended to operate or become effective without that command. We
find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government
in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unex-
pressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is
not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed
by a state. The Act is applicable to "persons" including corporations (§ 7),
and it authorizes suits under it by persons and corporations (§ 15). A
state may maintain a suit for damages under it, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159, but the United States may not, United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S.
600--conclusions derived not from the literal meaning of the words "Per-
son" and "corporation" but from the purpose, the subject matter, the con-
text and the legislative history of the statute.
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's
legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was ultimately enacted
as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only "business combina-
tions". 21 Cong. Rec. 2562, 2457; see also at 2459, 2461. That its purpose
was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and attempts to mo-
nopolize by individuals and corporations, abundantly appears from its leg-
islative history ...
True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is
lawful [emphasis added], Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 332, 344-47; and we have no question of the state or its municipal-
ity becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by
others for restraint of trade, cf. Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 313
U.S. 450. Here the state command to the Commission and to the program
committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the
Sherman Act since, in view of the latter's words and history, it must be
taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state action. It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate program.
Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, and
a prorate program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved
by referendum of producers, it is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and which enforces it with penal sanc-
tions, in the execution of a governmental policy. The prerequisite
approval of the program upon referendum by a prescribed number of pro-
ducers is not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by
force of agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits. The
state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the regulation and
in prescribing the conditions of its application. The required vote on the
referendum is one of these conditions.
The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no con-
tract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or
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administrative agency), the limits of the holding were left for the
future. 8 Likewise, a definitive statement of the underlying ra-
tionale for the decision (i.e., whether it was based on federal pre-
emption or was merely a judicially created exception) was left for
explanation in cases to come.49
2.2 Basic Limits of Parker: Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates
The question of state antitrust liability did not reach the Court
again for thirty years; 50 however, the first case to address the is-
to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of
government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
317 U.S. at 350-52 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
48. "[Ilt is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the pro-
gram and which enforces it . . .in the execution of a governmental policy." 317
U.S. at 352. Hence, Parker expressly holds only that a state may act to restrain
trade without violating the Sherman Act. The language of the case left a gap of
uncertainty where the conduct of entities merely associated with the state was
concerned.
49. The question of whether the "Parker Doctrine" is a judicially created ex-
emption or an application of federal preemption norms is arguably pivotal in de-
termining the scope of the Doctrine. This follows from judicial hesitance to
expand federal Congressional Acts beyond their clearly expressed limits where
preemption is the issue, and the Court's similar hesitation to find "implied exemp-
tions" to the coverage of the antitrust laws. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and
Light, 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978). Thus, if the Doctrine is preemption based, the pre-
sumption should be against a narrow interpretation of its limits. In contrast, if the
Doctrine is exemption based, the presumption should be towards limiting the ap-
plicable scope of the Doctrine.
Many respected commentators argue that the Doctrine is preemption based.
See 2 VON KALiNOWSKI, supra note 13, § 7.20[1], at 7-310-312.1; Handier, Antitrust -
1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1374, 1378 (1978) (cited in VON KALINOWSm). The Supreme
Court's post-Parker decisions tend to identify the Doctrine as exemption based.
See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788; Cantor, 428 U.S. at 600; Bates, 433 U.S. at 361,
363, 404 (both the majority and dissent refer to the Parker exemption); Orin Fox,
439 U.S. at 109-10; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc.,
445 U.S. at 102.
Furthermore, on its face, the language of Parker is the language of preemption.
The Court not only searched for some indicia of legislative intent to "occupy the
field" covered by the prorate Act, but also searched for the elements of a Sherman
Act violation. 317 U.S. at 350-52. The arguments for two theories intertwine. That
the lower courts continued to struggle with the issue through Boulder is indicative
of how dull the line of demarcation is. It is important to note that the Parker
Court never expressly adopted one theory or the other as the sole basis for its an-
titrust holding. All of the language in the decision arguably supports either or
both theories. Since both theories supported the Court's decision, there was no
need to choose.
50. The Court mentioned the Doctrine peripherally in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and Schwegman Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1959).
sue seemed to set off a chain reaction of litigation that seemed
only to add to the haze. At issue in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar5' was the State Bar's minimum fee schedule. While the
State, acting through its supreme court, compelled certain con-
duct on the part of the State Bar, the fee schedule was the result
of a mere suggestion by the state legislature that the quality of le-
gal services was related to their cost.5 2
The Goldfarb court rejected the State Bar's Parker Doctrine
claim of exemption, holding that the doctrine would apply only
where the challenged conduct was "compelled by the state acting
as sovereign."53 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not dis-
cuss the nature of the Parker Doctrine, referring to it as the
"Parker exception" from antitrust liability.
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 54 the Court examined what sort of
conduct would amount to the requisite state compulsion. Defend-
ant's electric company's rates were set by the company subject to
state approval. The approved structure included a free light bulb
exchange program. Plaintiff alleged that the program was an ille-
gal tying arrangement 5 and that the company's conduct was an
improper use of monopoly power. The power company asserted
that the light bulb program was compelled by the state and that it
was therefore immune to liability under Parker. A divided Court
51. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court.
52. The pricing plan in Goldfarb was similar to that in Parker in that it was
imposed in part by a state adminstrative agency (i.e., the State Bar). However, in
sharp contrast to Parker, there was no express legislative intent to set prices. The
controlling statutes then provided merely that the State Supreme Court of Ap-
peals could adopt rules and regulations regarding legal conduct; see Va. Code § 54-
56 (1972). The state supreme court adopted various regulations concerning fees,
none of which expressly commanded the adoption of a minimum fee schedule set
by the State Bar. Rather, the rules suggested that one factor in setting fees should
be "the customary charges of the Bar for similar services." 421 U.S. at 789 n.19.
The state bar, in turn, adopted such schedules which were apparently closely
followed by the county bar associations in Virginia. However, all the state bar was
expressly required to do was investigate and report violations of rules promul-
gated by the court. None of the rules required that a fee schedule be set. Id.
53. The court observed that the focus of inquiry was whether the activity was
required by the state. Anticompetitive conduct that was merely "prompted" by
state action, as in Goldfarb, was held insufficient. 421 U.S. at 790-91.
54. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). The facts in Cantor fell squarely between those in
Parker and Goldfarb. The result was a sharply divided court. Justices Brennan,
Marshall and White joined Justice Stevens' plurality opinion; Chief Justice Burger
joined in portions of Justice Stevens' opinion and filed a concurrence to establish
the majority. Justice Blackmun filed another concurrence. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart in his dissent. Thus, the Court announced four
distinct views as to the proper manner in which to resolve the case-three of those
by members establishing the majority.
55. 428 U.S. at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring.) See supra note 23 for an expla-
nation of what constitutes an illegal tying agreement. In short, the sale of electric-
ity was "tied" to the sale of light. Those who bought electricity in Detroit in effect
were forced to purchase a certain number of light bulbs as well.
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managed a slim majority opinion holding that the utility's conduct
in giving light bulbs away was merely approved by the state, not
compelled by the state.5 6
The Court examined the flip-side of the compulsion course in
Bates v. Arizona State Bar. 57 There, the Bar's limitations on law-
yer advertising withstood antitrust challenge because they were
compelled by the state (acting through its supreme court).5 8 As
in Goldfarb and Cantor, the Court gave no determinative indica-
56. Cantor created more confusion that anything else. Three justices con-
tended that Parker did not even apply to the case as the actor was not a public
entity. 428 U.S. at 591. The heart of the majority opinion was that the light bulb
program was the utility's idea-not the state's. The approval of the rate structure
was thus viewed as nothing more than "authorizing" the conduct, an act expressly
beyond Parker's limits. ("[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it...." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.)
Although Chief Justice Burger concurred with the majority, he rejected the view
that Parker could only apply to state officials.
Justice Blackmun approached the case with preemption analysis (as opposed to
the majority's exemption method) concluding that the legislature had preempted
any state conduct or legislation merely authorizing anti-competitive conduct. He
thus arrived at the same conclusion by different means. 428 U.S. at 605 (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
The dissent concluded that the Court's decision "[would] ... surely result in
the disruption of the operation of every state-regulated public utility in the nation
and in the creation of 'the prospect of massive treble damage liabilities' ..... ." 428
U.S. at 615 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Posner, The Proper Relationship Be-
tween State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 693, 728
(1974)). History shows that the Justice may have overstated or misstated the
case's impact. There appears to have been no disruption of state-regulated utili-
ties. On the other hand, Cantor eventually led to Lafayette and Boulder, both of
which spurred considerable litigation on the local level.
Despite its overstatement, the dissent presented an interesting preemption the-
ory of the case. First, the utility "petitioned the state" to approve its proposed tar-
riff. Even if this proposal included otherwise illegal restraints, the petition was
protected under the Noerr Doctrine. Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127
(1961) (holding that private parties may petition for anti-competitive state regula-
tion without violating the antitrust laws). Second, Michigan approved the tariff
with the restraint. No violation occurred there because the state acted-not the
utility-a rather straightforward application of Parker in the dissent's eyes. Third,
the utility complied with the tariff terms as required by state law. Under Gold-
farb, this amounted to state compulsion to act.
57. 433 U.S. 350 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881. Justice Blackmun wrote for
the unanimous (as to the antitrust issue) Court. The bulk of the Bates opinion
deals with the first amendment issue raised by the case; however, the Court also
attempted to clarify Cantor. Discussion of the Parker Doctrine was a necessary
part of the decision from a traditional standpoint in that the Court normally re-
solves cases on statutory grounds if at all possible. Thus, the Court's comments
on Parker are far from mere dicta.
58. Bates is factually very similar to Parker, the major difference being that
the acting body was a state supreme court rather than a state legislature. From a
tion as to whether the Parker Doctrine was exemption or preemp-
tion based.5 9
With these decisions, the Court established the basic bounds of
the Parker Doctrine. The decisions are best viewed as reference
points on a continuum representing the degree of state involve-
ment in the decision to displace competition. Near one end are
Parker and Bates; at the other Goldfarb. Midway lies Cantor,
with its facts placing it just within the liability range of the
continuum. 60
2.3 City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Company
Lack of authority notwithstanding, it was generally assumed
that state subdivisions (i.e., municipalities) and their agents were
more or less safe from antitrust liability.6 1 While Boulder eventu-
ally sank this notion, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Parker point of view, however, the difference is immaterial because both entities
are ultimately the state.
The Court distinguished Bates from Goldfarb on the origin or the challenged re-
straint; the state v. the bar association. Cantor was likewise distinguished, for the
"real" actor there was the utility, not the state. In this context, one might argue
that the Model Rules were initiated by the American Bar Association (a private
body) and merely "approved" by the Arizona Court. See 433 U.S. at 362, n.15 (stat-
ing that the Model Rules were first incorporated merely by reference).
In concluding its discussion of the antitrust issue, the Court observed:
The disciplinary rules reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy with
regard to professional behavior. Moreover, as the instant case shows, the
rules are subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Ari-
zona Supreme Court-in enforcement proceedings. Our concern that fed-
eral policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to
state policy is reduced in such a situation; we deem it significant that the
state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed and that the State's
supervision is so active.
Id. Bates thus presents the first suggestion that the presence of some sort of
ongoing state review or supervision of conduct restraining trade might be a neces-
sary element of the Parker Doctrine. Although never mentioned by the Court in
Parker, such supervision was an integral part of the raisin marketing plan.
59. See supra note 54. While discussing this point, the Court first denotes the
Parker Doctrine as an exemption, then speaks in the language of preemption. See
433 U.S. at 361-62.
60. For purposes of analyzing the Parker line of cases, it is helpful to present a
continuum of state involvement in the decision to displace competition. The end
points are Parker, Bates (no liability) and Goldfarb (liability).
Clearly Cantor Clearly






61. Areeda, Antitrust Immunity For State Action After "Lafayette", 95 HARv.
L. REV. 435, 438-39 (1981).
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Light Company62 amounted to a shot across the bow, warning of
what was to come.
The shot was, however, a shaky one. While five justices agreed
that the City was subject to antitrust liability, there was no major-
ity opinion as to why such liability existed. Four justices felt that
the immunity of any state subdivision had to flow from the state
as sovereign. Thus, in order for Parker type immunity to exist,
the subdivision had to act pursuant to an affirmatively expressed
state policy designed to replace competition with regulation.63 In
his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger agreed that while
such authorization was required, it was needed only where the
subdivision was acting more like a private party than like a gov-
ernment entity.64 In his view, the nature of the activity as "pro-
prietary" or "non-proprietary" was determinative.65
The decision in Lafayette created more questions than it an-
swered. Of them, the most important was for what activities and
on what grounds antitrust liability apply to state subdivisions.
Also left for another time were the questions of whether state
subdivisions could be liable for treble damages and how particu-
lar and "clear" the authorizing legislation would have to be to
confer the state's immunity.66 These questions were not ad-
dressed again until Boulder; however, before Boulder the Court
twice encountered the general question of state immunity. Both
of these decisions merit review before considering Boulder and
its impact.
62. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). On the Parker continuum, Lafayette was a close call.
Hence, the Court produced five opinions, none of which state a majority method of
analysis for the outcome in the case.
63. 435 U.S. at 413. This was in substance a restatement of the "threshold" re-
quirement, clarified in Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates. The Court suggested that mu-
nicipalities could be equated to state administrative agencies and that any
protection from antitrust liability therefore arose out of a state command rather
than out of the municipalities' status as a subdivision of state government. 435
U.S. at 413.
64. Although such a distinction is not always clear, it was in Lafayette. The
city was selling electric power outside the city limits. Its customers in this area
had no voice in the operation of the utility (only city residents vote on city govern-
ment affairs) and were therefore dealing with a "private party."
65. Areeda, supra note 61, at 441.
66. Id. at 441-42. The possibility that the Chief Justice's "propriety" tract
might later be adopted left an additional question: What is a proprietary activity?
Id. at 443.
2.4 Filling in the Doctrine: New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orin
Fox Co. and California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.
Hot on the heels of Lafayette, New Motor Vehicle Board of Cal-
ifornia v. Orin W. Fox Co.67 involved a challenge to a statute al-
lowing car dealers to block the installation of another car
dealership in certain stituations.68 The Court rejected the anti-
trust claim stating that the "dispositive answer [was] that the...
Act's regulatory scheme [was] a system of regulation, clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfet-
tered business freedom [in a particular arena]." The Court also
noted with approval that the operation of the program was "sub-
ject to ongoing regulatory supervision."69 California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.70 involved a
challenge of California's wine pricing system. The state required
all wine producers, wholesalers and rectifiers to file "fair trade
contracts" or price schedules with the state. No state licensed
wine merchant was permitted to sell wine to a retailer at any
price lower than those set in the fair trade contracts. 71
In rejecting the assertion of state action immunity, the
Supreme Court reviewed the Parker line of cases summarizing
their holdings:
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under
Parker v. Broum. First, the challenged restraint must be "one clearly ar-
67. 439 U.S. 96 (1973). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that other than the antitrust issues were
raised.
68. Under the California Automobile Franchise Act, a motor vehicle manu-
facturer must secure the approval of the California New Motor Vehicle
Board before opening a retail motor vehicle dealership within the market
area of an existing franchise, if and only if that existing franchise protests
the establishment of the competing dealership. The Act also directs the
Board to notify the manufacturer of this statutory requirement upon the
filing of a timely protest by an existing franchisee. The Board is not re-
quired to hold a hearing on the merits of the dealer protest before sending
the ... notice .
Id. at 98.
69. Id. at 109-10.
70. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the unanimous
Court. Justice Brennan did not take part in the consideration of the case.
71. Id. at 99-100. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24862, 24864-66, 24880
(West Supp. 1980 & Supp. 1984). The heart of the legislation in question is set
forth in two paragraphs:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and rec-
tifier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailer or consumers for
which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair contract and fie a schedule of resale prices, if he
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers.
Id. at § 24866.
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ticulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"; second; the policy
must be "actively supervised by the state itself." [Citation omitted]7 2
The unanimous Court specifically cited the plurality in Lafayette
for this proposition; however, the page cited includes reference to
a footnote that points out that the active supervision requirement
may, or may not, be applicable to a state subdivision.73 Thus, al-
though the Midcal Court adopted the Lafayette plurality's re-
quirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" as to
state subdivisions, the question of a need for active supervision
was left open.
These cases in hand, Community Communications Company,
Inc. headed to court to fight for the right to expand its Boulder
cable television system.
2.5 Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder
In Community Communications Company v. City of Boulder, 74
the Supreme Court held that the Parker Doctrine's requirement
of clear articulation and affirmative expression was not satisfied
by a broad delegation of state power through a state constitution's
"home rule" provision. Before proceeding to analyze the Court's
opinions, it will be helpful to review the facts of the dispute that
led to litigation and the application of the pre-Boulder Parker
Doctrine to those facts by the lower courts.
2.5.1 Facts: "Wanted - The BEST Cable System for Boulder"
When cable first came to Boulder in 1964, its only function was
to provide acceptable television reception for viewers blocked by
terrain from over the air signals. 75 The University Hills area of
Boulder was the only part of town where reception was a prob-
lem, so only it was "wired." The remainder of the city was left un-
wired presumably because there was no business reason to do
otherwise, as residents could receive service merely by extending
72. 445 U.S. at 105.
73. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 n.40.
74. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote for the Court joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Justice Stevens fied a concurring
opinion, while Chief Justice Burger, Justices O'Connor and White joined Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. Justice Stevens' concurrence expressed no separate reason
for the result. Thus, while Boulder is a close case, it is a more definitive statement
of the law than Lafayette (where there was no majority view of the reasoning be-
hind the result).
75. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. This type of service is mod-
ernly referred to as "basic cable."
an antenna. However, the explosion of special cable program-
ming services in the late 1970's created a use for cable in the rest
of Boulder. Community Communications Company (CCC), the
successor in interest to the original 1964 franchise holder, set out
to upgrade its system and offer all of Boulder services that were
unavailable over the air.
In May of 1979, CCC wrote to the mayor of Boulder advising her
of its intention to expand its service area to include the entire city
and of its intention to install a satellite dish (downlink) in order
to offer special "cable only" services on the system. 76 To effect
the expansion, CCC began to negotiate telephone pole ease-
ments 77 with local utility companies and arrange for the installa-
tion of a downlink. As the pole easements were secured, CCC
began installing cable. Meanwhile, a newly formed cable com-
pany, Boulder Cable Communications (BCC) informed the mayor
that it too would seek a city-wide franchise to provide cable serv-
ice. BCC stated that it intended to build its system regardless of
CCC's future plans. 78
Faced with two parties interested in providing cable service, the
City Commission decided to study the question in general terms.
A cable consultant was hired to review the options available. Citi-
zen advocates approached the council expressing their concern
76. 485 F. Supp. at 1037. "Cable only services should soon be available every-
where in the United States by consumer oriented direct-to-home satellite trans-
mission. The total control over the availability of such services will thus be
wrested from local hands. See J. RoMAN, supra note 2, at 50-56.
77. Cable for a system may be installed either above or below ground. Gener-
ally, the easiest way to install a system is to place the cable along the same path
that utilities follow. Since utility companies generally own the easements through
which their wires and pipes pass, the cable company must arrange for use of part
of the easements. This, in turn, is accomplished by the creation of additional ease-
ments in the existing easements. See 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
78. 485 F. Supp. at 1037. "[WIhatever action the City takes in regard to TCI
[parent of CCC], it is the plan of BCC to begin building its system as soon as fea-
sible . . . ." Panel Discussion, The Antitrust Panic of 1982: Is It Justified?, PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT, January 1983, at 11 (Bud Westdyke, City Manager, Boulder, Colo-
rado, speaking). BCC's choice of words to convey its message to the city seems
curious in that there was no indication then (in the public record) that the City
planned to do anything about the CCC expansion. Their willingness to compete
was, however, short lived.
Had BCC and CCC built in the same areas of the city, residents in those areas
would be able to chose between cable services. In trade jargon, such a situation is
known as an "overbuild." There are eight franchise areas in the country presently
"overbuilt." Overbuilds Subject of Study, CABLEVISION, April 4, 1983, at 220. Only
three of these systems are reported to be economically viable. Id. Two advanced
systems are competing head-to-head in some areas of Phoenix, Arizona. Each sys-
tem is owned by a major MSO (Multiple System Operator) (Cox Cable and Times
Mirror Cable). See Gits, Andrenalin Days, CABLEVISION PLus, Jan. 17, 1983, at 4.
Whether both will eventually be profitable is uncertain, however, neither company
is plowing money into a system with loss as a goal.
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that once CCC had the rest of the city wired, no one else would
be interested in the franchise and that the city would then be
stuck with whatever CCC decided to install.79 The consultant's
report concurred, emphasizing that "the city should be concerned
about the tendency of a cable system to become a natural
monopoly."8o
As CCC continued to install cable in previously unwired areas,
the council prepared a "model" cable TV ordinance that ex-
pressed the council's goal for Boulder's cable system. The council
envisioned that bids for franchises would be based on the model,
with the successful bidder(s) expected to operate under a similar
document. The model plan provided for:
The city's right to purchase the cable company, at a price excluding good-
will and limited to depreciated investment; the city's right of prior ap-
proval of every company contract; rate regulation; the city's right to
change rates at any time; a 5% franchise fee (two and one-half times the
present fee); a requirement for five leased access channels; a complaint
procedure monitored by the city manager, with a liquidated damage provi-
sion; a requirement to upgrade company facilities continually to state-of-
the-art conditions; and a requirement for renegotiation, at specified inter-
vals, of rate structures, free or discounted service, services provided, pro-
gramming offered, and human rights. 8 1
BCC wrote the city again in November 1979, offering to accept
the terms set forth in the model ordinance. The company ex-
pressed its desire that the city grant BCC a permit and discard
plans to seek bids based on the model franchise. Alternatively,
BCC stated that it would participate in the bidding process, but
suggested that it would accept a franchise only if CCC's license
was modified to limit its service area or altogether revoked, al-
though earlier CCC had claimed it was willing to compete.82
Whatever its motivation, the council decided in December to act
on the question of cable service.8 3 Two emergency ordinances
79. The 1964 franchise under which CCC was operating had no programming
requirements, hence, CCC could provide whatever sort of service it desired. Price,
Moratorium on Boulder Cable Expansion Initiates Series of Legal Actions, TVC,
March 1, 1980, at 21.
80. 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
81. 630 F.2d at 710 (emphasis by the Court in reference to first amendment
problems). Franchise agreements with similar terms are not at all unusual. For a
sample franchise agreement and bid request, see CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
CATV 245-338 (1981) (G. Shapiro, ed.).
82. 630 F.2d at 710. This assertion stood in stark contrast to BCC's earlier
claims that it was willing to compete with CCC. See supra note 78 and accompa-
nying text.
83. The City Council claimed that it was acting to promote competition. Panel
were enacted. The first revoked the 1964 franchise ordinance and
reenacted it with a three-month moratorium on expansion. 84 The
second ordinance unilaterally amended the 1964 franchise ordi-
nance to restrict any expansion by CCC for three months. The
city also asked 50 companies to propose systems for Boulder.8 5
CCC, apparently unimpressed with the legality of the ordi-
nances restricting its expansion, continued its installation of
cable. The city council, equally unimpressed with CCC's irrever-
ence for its authority, sent out work crews to tag along behind
CCC installers and tear the cable down.86 The city went to the
Boulder District Court seeking to enjoin further wiring by CCC,
but relief was denied.87 CCC in turn sought to prevent further
negative action by the city. The cable company filed suit in fed-
eral court claiming that, among other things, the city's expansion
ban violated the antitrust laws and the first amendment. The
company asked the court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinances
and any other conduct hampering CCC's 1964 franchise rights.88
Putting aside for a moment the issues involved, the equities of
the controversy merit consideration. The expressed goals of all
parties were seemingly noble. CCC wanted to provide the best
cable system possible and was acting-in its expressed mind-to
protect competition. BCC wanted to provide new cable service to
the city--either alone or, at least initially, alongside CCC. That is
what everyone said they were trying to do. However, the facts
raise many legitimate questions as to the true motives of the com-
batants. The technology to deliver special cable programming
had existed for a number of years before CCC moved to expand.89
Had CCC moved as quickly as was reasonable from a business
point of view, or was it merely reacting to recent local concerns to
protect its de facto monopoly?90 As for the city and BCC, how
Discussion, The Antitrust Panic, supra note 78, at 11 (Bud Westdyke, city manager,
Boulder, Colorado, speaking). CCC feared that the city was acting to protect BCC
at CCC's expense, perhaps even on BCC's suggestion. Price, Moratorium Initiates
Legal Actions, supra note 79, at 22-23.
84. 485 F. Supp. at 1037. The ordinance provided that continued operation of
the system constituted acceptance of the new terms.
85. Panel Discussion, supra note 78, at 11.
86. 630 F.2d at 710. See also Price, supra note 79, at 21.
87. Price, supra note 79, at 22 and 26. See 630 F.2d at 710.
88. 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
89. Special programming became available by satellite in 1975, but was avail-
able by land microwave link in 1972. HAMBURG, supra note 1, at 353.
90. In the eyes of some residents, the service offered by CCC was less than
admirable. See Antitrust Panic, supra note 78, at 10. CCC's announced plans for
additional "cable-only" channels did not meet the expectations of some commu-
nity members. They wanted "two-way" cable, cable security services, local access
production facilities and more. Id. For a discussion of these capabilities see J. Ro-
MAN, supra note 2, at 37-39.
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close were the ties, if any, between BCC prinicipals who were for-
mer city officials and the city council? Were the council members
acting in the best interest of the city, or for the financial benefit of
their friends? It seems curious that most of the prinicipals were
politically connected.9 1 In short, the facts present no clearcut
"good guy."
2.5.2 The Lower Court Decisions
Community Communication's complaint cited two major theo-
ries to support enjoining enforcement of Boulder's new ordi-
nances: (1) the enactment of the ordinances was a violation of the
antitrust laws92 and (2) the ordinances operated in violation of
CCC's rights under the first amendment. 93 Although the court
discussed both issues, its decision was grounded primarily on the
antitrust claim. The trial court's antitrust analysis exemplifies the
difficulty courts encountered in applying the Parker Doctrine.
91. Id. Such potential conflicts are not uncommon. In Houston, the cable TV
market was divided by region among four companies. The mayor then informed
the companies that they would have to make room for a fifth. Of course, that the
fifth firm was partially controlled by the mayor's attorney had no bearing on the
other firm's decision to acquiesce. Entry was subsequently denied a sixth com-
pany. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983).
For the original territory breakdown, see Gits, Houston Hustle, CABLEVISION, June
20, 1983 at 171, 182. Questions of such patronage have also arisen in Marquette,
Michigan where the company awarded the franchise sought initial financing from
local banks with city commissioners on their boards of directors. Kagan, Cable
T. V. Franchising, News Roundup: Cox to Pull the Plug In Marquette, December 17,
1982, at 304. For the local view see Neubrecht, City Eyes Action to Halt Cable TV
Service Cut Off, Marquette Mining J., Dec. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 1. See also Kagan,
Boulder Litigation Roundup, CABLE T.V. FRANCHISING, July 30, 1982, at 1.
92. 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
93. Id. at 1040. The court rejected CCC's assertion that the first amendment
precluded all regulation, but found a fine line between permissible regulation of
the use of public ways and impermissible content regulation. There seems to be
little justification (other than pole space limits and the need to avoid having public
ways repeatedly torn up for cable installation) for putting a cap on the number of
systems in a given area. Cable has none of the "spectrum limitations" that justify
many of the limits on broadcasters, yet, because most households are passed by
only one cable system, the most pervasive speech limits of broadcasting are ap-
plied with near equal force to cablecasting. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, 76.209 (1982). The
FCC is presently considering repealing the rules. In the matter of Amendment of
Part 76, Subpart G of the Commission's Rule and Regulations Concerning the
Fairness Doctrine and Political Cablecasting Requirements for Cable Television
Systems, 48 F.R. 26472 (1983). See Reddy, Fairness Question Debated, CABLEVI-
SION, September 12, 1983, at 53. For a review of the major content limitations pres-
ently imposed on broadcasters and cablecasters, see The Law of Political
Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C. 2d 2209 (1978); Fairness Report, 48
F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974).
The court looked to the standards set forth in Midcal and La-
fayette and concluded that Parker Doctrine immunity was avail-
able to states and cities, but only when they were acting in a
"governmental capacity." 94 Thus, the court looked for a "clearly
articulated, affirmatively expressed" policy to displace competi-
tion promulgated not by the state, but by the city acting in its gov-
ernmental capacity.95 No such policy was found. Accordingly, the
court found the city subject to antitrust liability and also found
facts sufficient to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.96
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court, expressly
finding that the city had acted within the scope of the authority
afforded by the state's "home rule" provision,97 and that the ordi-
nances were enacted pursuant to an affirmatively expressed city
plan to displace competition that was subject to active city super-
vision.98 The court's understandings of the requirements of the
Parker Doctrine differed from those of the trial court. The judges
concluded that Lafayette required express state policy to displace
competition (as opposed to such expression by the state's dele-
gate) only where the municipality was involved in some sort of
proprietary activity.99 The court turned to the Midcal decision for
a standard of liability:
The Court in California Retail set out two standards for governmental
antitrust immunity: First, the challenged restraint must be "one clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed as State policy"; second, the policy
must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. (445 U.S. at 105, 100 S.
Ct. at 943, citing City of Lafayette, supra. ) The latest test for the Parker
exemption has been met by the City of Boulder. The policy was affirma-
tively expressed throuqh the language of the ordinances. The second part
of the California Retail test was met by the active supervision and en-
forcement of the policy by imposition of the 90-day moratorium on con-
struction and by issuance of civil and then criminal citations to cable
workers when the moratorium was ignored.' 0 0
Ignored by the court was the fact that Midcal dealt with the
regulatory acts of a state while the case before it dealt with the
94. 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
95. The Court's opinion necessarily assumes that Parker was available to cit-
ies since it proceeds to question the nature of the city's conduct. "[T]he approach
taken is not an appropriate exercise and articulation of a policy of regulation." Id.
96. The traditional elements of probability of success and nature of irrepara-
ble harm were considered. The court found that CCC might well be able to prove
an antitrust violation on the city's part and that issuing the injunction would cause
the city no permanent harm while denying issuance would cause CCC substantial
irreparable harm.
97. 630 F.2d 704, 705-07 (10th Cir. 1980). In contrast, the trial court found only
that the City had the authority to regulate cable. In the trial court's view, the
method chosen to exercise the power was improper.
98. Id. at 708.
99. The dissent notes that this distinction is found relevant by a sole justice in
Lafayette. 630 F.2d at 717 (Markey, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 708 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
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regulatory acts of a city. The reality of the court's view was that a
home rule city equaled the state provided there was no proprie-
tary involvement in the challenged conduct. 0 1 Citing what it
dubbed the "Parker-Midcal doctrine," the court found the city's
conduct exempt from the proscription of the antitrust law and dis-
solved the injunction.
2.5.3 The Supreme Court Decision
In the Supreme Court's view, the issue presented was "whether
a 'home rule' municipality, granted by the state constitution ex-
tensive powers of self-government in local and municipal matters,
enjoys the 'state action' exemption from the Sherman Act liability
announced in Parker. .. ,02 After reviewing the facts of the
case, the Court turned to examine the elements of the Parker
Doctrine, concluding that Boulder's moratorium ordinance was
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny unless it constituted state ac-
tion as a sovereign: "municipal action in furtherance or imple-
mentation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy."103
The city argued that both of the tests were satisfied. First, it
claimed to be acting as the state by virtue of the delegation of
state power through the home rule amendment. 0 4 The Court re-
jected this view as misstating the spirit and the letter of the law.
Although it was never expressly stated, the Court necessarily
101. Id. The dissent rejected this notion, asserting there is no room for local
exercise of state power absent express delegation. "We are a nation not of 'city-
states,' but of States." Id. at 717.
102. Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 43 (1982). Justice
Brennan wrote for the majority, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell
and Stevens. Justice Stevens fied a separate, but consistent, concurring opinion.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent.
The majority's statement of the issue implicitly adopts the express reasoning of
the court of appeals in Lafayette that a "subordinate state governmental body is
not ipso facto exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." 532 F.2d 431, 434
(1976).
103. 455 U.S. at 52. The essence of Parker was to declare that municipalities are
substantially akin to private entities for purposes of Sherman Act liability.
104. 455 U.S. at 52.
Respondent city urges that the only distinction between the present
case and Parker is that here the act of government is imposed by a home
rule city rather than by the state legislature. Under Parker and Colorado
law, the argument continues, this is a distinction without a difference,
since in the sphere of local affairs home rule cities in Colorado possess
every power once held by the state legislature.
Id. at 53 n.17.
concluded that a state may not make a broad delegation of its sov-
ereign authority. 105
The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody
in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a sig-
nificant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle
contains its own limitation: Ours is a "dual system of government,"
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added), which has no place for sover-
eign cities. 10 6
The city's second argument was that even if it wasn't acting in
the state's shoes, it was acting pursuant to a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed plan to displace competition. The
"plan" was theoretically imbedded in the home rule amend-
ment.10 7 This contention was rejected for the same underlying
reasons as the city's first argument.
[PJlainly the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expres-
sion" is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality
respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A State
that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to
have "contemplated" the specific anticompetitive actions for which munici-
pal liability is sought. Nor can those actions be truly described as "com-
prehended within the powers granted," since the term, "granted,"
necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the subject by the State.
The State did not do so here: The relationship of the State of Colorado to
Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality. l 0 8
Thus, the Court concluded that notwithstanding the litigation
105. If a broad delegation of power was assumed possible by the court, no fur-
ther discussion would have been necessary, the requirements of Parker being met
by the home rule amendment.
106. 455 U.S. at 53.
107. Id. at 54-55. Were this argument accepted, one could assert that home rule
clauses contemplated displacement of competition in any area of concern primar-
ily to the City. Whether such a result is desirable is quite obviously a policy
rather than legal question. In that regard, such a result would seem inconsistent
with the Sherman Act's goal of vigorous competition.
The City further argued that the ordinances were unculpable in that they went
to a non-proprietary rather than proprietary activity. Although the Court con-
cludes that the distinction is irrelevant as to the City's liability, the question of the
distinction's application in determining the nature of liability is left open. 455 U.S.
at 55 n.18.
For the text of the Colorado home rule amendment, see COLO. CONST., Art. XX,
§ 6.
108. 455 U.S. at 55. The Court went on to find invalid the city's stand that the
home rule amendment effectively allowed municipalities to choose for themselves
whether to regulate certain areas.
[I]n Boulder's view, it can pursue its course of regulating cable television
competition, while another home rule city can choose to proscribe monop-
oly service, while still another can elect free-market competition: and all
of these policies are equally "contemplated," and "comprehended within
the powers granted." Acceptance of such a proposition-that the general
grant of power to enact ordinances necessarily implies state authoriziation
to enact specific anticompetitive ordinances-would wholly eviscerate the
concepts of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" that our prece-
dents require.
Id. at 56. This language is of particular importance in evaluating post-Boulder leg-
islative attempts to secure municipal immunity.
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its decision might spark, the policy behind the Sherman Act ne-
cessitated a finding that the home rule amendment was insuffi-
cient to insulate Boulder from liability.
The dissent' 0 9 found two major flaws in the Court's holding.
First, it disagreed with the majority's preemption theory." 0 The
dissent suggested that if preemption norms were properly ap-
plied, the statute would merely be held invalid; no penalties
would be assessed against the enacting authority."'
The dissent's second major point was that, by lumping munici-
palities together with private individuals, the Court destroyed the
"home rule" movement in the country. This was seen as a funda-
mental intrusion into the nature of the relationship between city
and state.112
Thus, for better or worse, Boulder left its mark on the Parker
Doctrine. Many aspects of applying the Doctrine to cities were
left unclear. Hence, an analysis of just what Boulder requires is
necessary.
PART 3
The Impact of Boulder- A Legislative Survey
Regardless of the merits of the allocation of state and local
power Boulder demands, the simple fact is that Boulder is the
law. Municipalities that ignore its implications are flirting with
fiscal disaster. The question thus becomes, how does a municipal-
ity go about regulating local activity without subjecting itself to
109. Id. at 60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. The dissent made various policy arguments in support of this conclusion,
but offered no law.
First, to say that Congress never intended to subject states to the antitrust laws
says nothing about its intent as to cities, i.e., regardless of whether Congress in-
tended the states to be exempt from the laws or if Congress simply did not intend
to preempt certain regulations, it does not follow that a similar intent was mani-
fest as to cities. Second, to assert that federal laws preempting other legislation
may not subject those who violate these norms to penalties is simply a misstate-
ment of the law. A municipality that breaks a contract by legislative act is subject
to a suit for damages.
111. Id. at 64-65. An exemption analysis clearly leads to the result of monetary
liability for if one is not exempt from a law's proscriptions, he is subject to its
penalties.
112. 455 U.S. at 70-71. However, the dissent's desire to lump cities together with
states (for Parker Doctrine purposes) ignores the realities of local government.
By its very nature, local government is more susceptible to undue and improper
influence than is state government. See id. at 68.
antitrust liability and, perhaps more importantly, to the defense
of antitrust claims beyond summary disposition? 1 3 The answer
to this question is neither simple nor definite; the Parker Doctrine
as a whole presents a tangled array of policy factors to consider
while Boulder itself expressly reserved judgment on matters of
significant importance."14
Any effort to deal with Boulder must therefore be based not
merely on the decision itself, but on the overall policy underlying
the Parker Doctrine. Going further, one would do well to examine
what others have done to deal with potential antitrust liability.
Hence, the questions left open by Boulder are considered here in
light of the Parker line of cases as a whole. Next, selected post-
Boulder decisons of the lower federal courts and commentary are
considered in an effort to predict how these open questions will
be resolved. Last, legislation enacted in response to Boulder is
surveyed in light of liberal and strict interpretations of Boulder's
requirements.
3.1 Unanswered Questions
The Boulder decision leaves four major unanswered questions:
(1) How "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" must stated
policy to displace competition be? Must the policy compel displace-
ment of competition?1 1
5
(2) Will active state supervision of a program implementing such policy
be required for immunity?
(3) Is the nature of the municipalities' conduct somehow determinative
in establishing standards for liability - i.e., are the rules regarding a
city acting as sovereign different than those for a city acting in a pro-
prietary capacity?1 1 6
(4) Where municipalities are found subject to antitrust liability:
(i) Will treble damages be available?
(ii) Will established per se rules of liability apply?
(iii) How will the "Rule of Reason" apply?1 1 7
113. The defense of an antitrust claim past summary disposition is so costly
that it amounts to a sort of penalty itself. For example, the city of Boulder spent a
quarter of a million dollars defending Community Communication Company's suit
before finally settling it. The Antitrust Panic of 1982: Is It Justified?, PUBLIC MAN-
AGEMENT, January 1983, at 10-11.
114. Boulder's unanswered questions are discussed infra at notes 115-37. See
also Brame & Feller, Antitrust Liability of Local Governments: The Effect of City
of Boulder, 9 VA. B.A.J. 14-15 (1983).
115. See Howard, The Perspective of a Defendant's Lawyer in ANTrTRUST & Lo-
CAL GOVERNMENT, 36-37 (J. Siena ed. 1982). As to Boulder's unanswered questions
in general, see Wiley, Boulder's Unanswered Questions: The Future of Cable
Franchising, NAT'L L.J., March 29, 1982, at 33, col. 1.
116. As Boulder clearly established, this distinction is irrelevant as to the avail-
ability of the Parker doctrine. However, it is unclear how and whether the distinc-
tion should be a factor in establishing actual liability.
117. See 455 U.S. at 60-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The overall policy of the Parker Doctrine and post-Boulder de-
cisions are next applied to these questions in turn.
3.1.1 Expression of State Policy
The question is, "how much is enough?" Clearly, under Boul-
der, a broad grant of authority under a home rule provision is in-
sufficient. However, it is not clear that the doctrine requires an
express state policy compelling the displacement of competition.
Lower courts reaching the issue to date have concluded that a
general statement of state policy that contemplates, rather than
requires, displacement of competition is sufficient for
immunity." 8
We hold that any municipality acting pursuant to clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy which evidences an intent of the legis-
lature to displace competition with regulation--Chether compelled, di-
rected, authorized or in the form of a prohibition-is entitled to antitrust
immunity because conduct pursuant to such a policy would constitute
state action. 119
118. See United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Date Conference, Inc., 1983-1
CCH Trad. Cases 65,320 (5th Cir. 1983). In Southern Motor Carriers, the court
held (on rehearing) that private parties could not enjoy Parker benefits absent a
state decision to displace competition; that the Doctrine would not protect a pri-
vate decision merely "contemplated" by state legislation. However, in reaching
this conclusion, the court observed:
A necessary corollary of the rationale of Goldfarb and Cantor is that
compulsion should not be required of state defendants. Regardless of
their motives for undertaking anticompetitive behavior, states are never-
theless acting as states. Since Goldfarb, the Court has consistently
pointed out that the analysis of state action differs substantially depend-
ing on whether the defendant is a private party or a public institution.
[Citations.] The same analysis applies to municipalities, at least when
they act as agents of the state. Thus, the Supreme Court has not required
compulsion for municipalities, but has held that when a state indicates its
intention that the municipality may act as an instrumentality of the state
- i.e., when the state "sanctions" anticompetitive behavior of the munici-
pality - a state action defense may be available to the municipality.
Southern Motor Carriers, 1983-1 CCH Trad. Cases at 69,890-91 (citations omitted).
119. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) (em-
phasis added). See also Gold Cross Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Kansas, 705 F.2d
1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that "a specific, detailed legislative
authorization "of monopoly service need not exist to infer the necessary
state intent." It is sufficient that "the legislature contemplated the kind of
action complained of." In other words, a sufficient state policy to displace
competition exists if the challenged restraint is a necessary or reasonable
consequence of engaging in the authorized activity.
Gold Cross, at 1012-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415). Ac-
cord, P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 212.3a, at 53-54 and n.8 (Supp. 1982) (cited by Hal-
lie and Gold Cross); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for State Action After Lafayette,
95 HARv. L. REV. 435, 466 (1981) (cited by Hallie and Gold Cross). See also Central
While it may be permissible to leave the decision to displace
competition up to the city, such an approach may fall victim to
the charge that the state is merely "authorizing" a violation of the
antitrust laws. A careful review of the Parker cases lends support
to the argument that the state need not compel displacement. All
the cases really require is that the state establish the mechanism
by which competition will be displaced. In Parker itself, the deci-
sion to regulate (and thus displace competition) was made by pri-
vate parties. The regulations were then developed by a state
agency required to base its findings on public hearings and were
implemented only upon the approval of those to be regulated.
Thus, the state simply set procedures to be followed in developing
the regulations-not the regulations themselves. The policy
served in Parker was the particular state goal of maintaining the
raisin market. 20
The same is not true in Goldfarb (where the Parker Doctrine
was held unavailable). There the state did nothing more than
mention a vague policy goal: quality legal services. The decision
to reach this goal by a price schedule was made by the bar associ-
ation. Likewise, the method in which the fees were determined
was established by the bar association. Although in effect a state
administrative agency, the state bar's conduct was without Parker
bounds because the state had not contemplated the method that
the bar selected to meet a legislative goal.121
Cantor presents a legal situation similar to Goldfarb despite
the fact that the equities would seem to favor a dissimilar result.
The light bulb program was of private design and served no state
policy. There was no state involvement in the initial means of the
decision. What troubled the Court was how the displacement de-
cision was made.122
Bates is also consistent with the proposition that what the
Court really is requiring is a state expression of how laws and
policies affecting free competition will be made along with some
expression or recognition of what ends they will serve. In Bates,
the state itself-through its supreme court--expressed the rule
and the goal it was to serve. Further, the state (acting through
the court) established the enforcement mechanism.123 By con-
trast, in Lafayette the state had merely determined that cities
Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste Agency, 1983-2
CCH Trad Cases 65,575 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding "exemption"); Parks v. Watson,
1983-2 Trade Cas. 65,632 (9th Cir. 1983) (denying exemption).
120. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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could operate electric utilities. Even if displacement of competi-
tion beyond city limits was contemplated by this grant of power,
there were no established means by which the displacement
could be accomplished. In short, there was no state expression of
how competition beyond city limits might be displaced.124
The Court's most recent decisions drive the point home. Orin
Fox presented a situation similar to that in Parker. The action of
the state was triggered by a private request; however, as in
Parker, the procedures followed thereafter were developed by the
state to serve a particular policy goal of the state.125 Such was not
the case in Midcal. There, as in Goldfarb and Cantor, the state's
involvement consisted solely of enforcing privately developed
rules. 126 Boulder simply strengthens the proposition. Colorado's
home rule provisions provide no guidance on the question of how
competition may be displaced. 27
In short, one could still argue that once a state has decided that
competition may be displaced by private parties or its subdivi-
sions, the only other determination required of the state (by
Parker) is how that displacement should be accomplished.128
However, in dealing with Boulder, it must be kept in mind that a
requirement of express compulsion lurks in the Parker cases.
3.1.2 Active State Supervision
Many commentators suggest that to be on the safe side, some
sort of state supervision should be included in legislation
designed to confer state immunity on municipal acts. 129 However,
other commentators and at least two post-Boulder decisions,
124. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
128. Assuming this view is eventually adopted, home rule provisions may still
stand (somewhat modified) in light of Boulder. The "home rule" article need only
be amended to provide that the state intends to displace competition in particular
named areas (i.e., cable, airport vending) when the representative government de-
cides, pursuant to state established and supervised procedures, and that the goals
of the state (better services in the given area) are served by the displacement of
competition. Such a "home rule" provision is consistent with the expressed policy
of the court, preserves local control, and protects from local political manipulation
to serve the private interests of those in power.
129. See, e.g., Orland, The Requirements for Antitrust Immunity, in ANTITRUST
AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 73, 81 ( J. Siena ed. 1983) ("State legislation that requires
municipal economic conduct is more likely to be successful than legislation that
simply permits municipal conduct.")
along with Boulder itself, suggest that active state supervision is
not required.130 As a sort of mid-ground, one might argue that the
normal process of the states' courts and political system provide a
sort of "supervision." Such supervision is hardly active and
would be effective where those affected had no voice in the poli-
cymaker's election or could not afford litigation. Nonetheless,
proof of the effective operation of such checks may convince trial
courts that ordinances are exempt until the question of state su-
pervision is resolved. A decision on the requirement of supervi-
sion could come this term.131
3.1.3 Rules of Liability
Should the nature of the municipalities' conduct-proprietary
or non-proprietary-be considered in determining liability? Some
have argued that state policy contemplating displacement is only
necessary where the municipalities' conduct is proprietary in na-
ture.13 2 While this contention has been rejected by a lower court,
the Boulder decision leaves the question open. When does an ac-
tivity become proprietary? It seems unlikely that such a distinc-
tion will be adopted by the Court.
130. Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution" in Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 ILL B.J.
684, 686 (1982) ("If the state clearly intended that the city be permitted to take a
course of action, it should not additionally be required to supervise that course.").
In analyzing the impact of Boulder, the Maryland Governor's Task Force on Lo-
cal Government Antitrust Liability observed:
In the view of the Task Force the quoted language from Boulder and La-
fayette as well as the views of most commentators are inconsistent with
the notion that active supervision by a state administrative agency is a
condition of municipal immunity. The requirement of active supervision
was originally enunciated in the Midcal case which related to private con-
duct, not to municipal conduct already subject to political restraints. No
such requirement in the view of the Task Force has been imposed as a
condition of municipal immunity by the federal cases.
Report of the Governor's Task Force on Local Government Antitrust Liability 21
(February 16, 1983). See also Orland, supra note 129, at 82.
In Hallie, the Seventh Circuit concluded that state supervision was not required
by Boulder and that, from a policy standpoint, requiring supervision was unwise.
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Gold
Cross Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983). The
court observed that "[b ecause Municipal officials generally are politically ac-
countable to the citizens they represent for their decisions regarding the chal-
lenged restraint, state supervision is not as necessary to prevent abuse as in the
private context." Id. See also Areeda, Antitrust Law, supra note 119, § 212.2a, at
47 (Supp. 1982) (" [RI equiring state authorization for local conduct is analogous to
requiring active supervision of private conduct; it tests whether challenged local
activity is truly state action and therefore entitled to immunity.").
131. The plaintiffs in Hallie applied for a writ of certiorari on May 11, 1983. 52
U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. May 11, 1983) (No. 82-1382).
132. If the conduct was non-proprietary, a city policy to displace competition
would satisfy Parker/Boulder.




The Act's language regarding treble damages for all guilty de-
fendants is not cast in stone. The antitrust laws are a fluid pack-
age designed to be applied in a manner consistent with their
overall policy goals. Bankrupting municipal governments or caus-
ing them to raise taxes to meet treble damage obligations is
hardly consistent with the laws' pro-competition goal.133 Yet, the
statute says plaintiff shall recover treble damages. 3 4 The best ad-
vice is to avoid liablilty in the first place and seek federal legisla-
tion amending the law to reflect the policy understandings set
forth above. 3 5
Per Se Rules, Rule of Reason
The arguments against the award of treble damages apply with
equal force against the application of the "per se" rules of liabil-
ity. These rules were adopted in litigation involving private par-
ties. To blindly apply them to cities is to ignore yet again the
policy of the antitrust laws. 3 6 It follows that the Rule of Reason
should be amended as applied to municipalities to include in the
balance the social benefits of the conduct in question. Because lo-
cal government is designed to protect such interests, any other
construction would defeat the primary purpose of municipal con-
trol. The ills of "Lochnerizing" may be avoided by judicial defer-
ence similar to that given legislation claimed to violate the due
process clause. The reason for denying this deference to private
parties is that such parties are not qualified to make such
assessments.
133. Hoskins, The "Boulder Revolution" in Municipal Antitrust Law, 70 IL. B.J.
684, 686-87 (1982) ("Such an argument, while bold, is not without hope of success.
The Supreme Court itself has encouraged the view that municipalities need not
necessarily be treated like other persons for purposes of imposing treble damages
under the Clayton Act.") See Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401-02.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
135. See Civilletti, The Fallout From Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder: Prospects For A Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U. L REV. 379, 392 (1983).
136. Hoskins, supra note 133, at 686.
3.1.5 Summary
The following points should be kept in mind when reviewing
legislation designed to deal with Boulder:
1. The broader the scope of the purported immunizing reach of the stat-
ute, the more likely it will be declared mere "authorization" of anti-
trust violations. The state policy providing for displacement must be
carefully set forth.
2. Legislation requiring displacement of competition, or providing for
state review of a decision to displace competition, is more likely to suc-
ceed than provisions leaving the decision to the city.
3. Boulder laws providing some sort of active state supervision are like-
wise the safer, although not necessarily required, route to antitrust
immunity. 137
3.2 Legislative Survey
An extensive analysis of all state legislation in this area is be-
yond the scope of this article. Only post-Boulder legislation is
considered. Legislation enacted before Boulder is not considered
even though it may be effective in dealing with Boulder's de-
mands. Further, it should be noted that some states did not re-
spond to inquiries regarding recent legislation. 138
3.2.1 California
In California, one law was enacted by the legislature and acts in
two other areas are under consideration. The new law is aimed at
providing antitrust immunity to "cities, counties, cities and coun-
ties, and certain special districts" that operate airports.139
The airport law sets out a particular state policy (the promotion
and development of commerce and tourism) and declares that
public airports must serve the policy. Next, the act "contem-
137. See generally Orland, supra note 129, at 80-82.
138. See, e.g., Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan
Solid Waste Agency, 1983-2 CCH Trade Cas. 65,575 (8th Cir. 1983), where the
court found Iowa's pre-Boulder solid waste disposal statute sufficient to confer
Parker Doctrine "immunity." See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B301-.308 (West Supp.
1983) (enacted in 1972 and last amended in 1982 to a non-Parker topic)).
A letter inquiring about legislative activity spawned by Boulder was sent to the
attorney general of each of the fifty states. Of the 40 states responding, 24 indi-
cated that there had been no legislation considered or enacted in response to
Boulder while 16 provided information about state legislation or policy regarding
Boulder. The efforts of the state attorneys general, state legislative research serv-
ices, private interest research services and their staffs were an integral part of this
survey.
The following states indicated that no Boulder inspired legislation had been
passed or considered: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Ver-
mont, West Virginia and Wyoming.
139. 1982 Cal. Stat. Ch. 767.
[Vol. 11: 635, 19841 Boulderlove: Local Antitrust Liability
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
plates" that in order to accomplish this end, the public airport op-
erators may need to displace competition.
[T]o further the policies and fulfill the objectives stated in this article, it is
often necessary that publicly owned or operated airports enter into exclu-
sive or limited agreements with a single operator or a limited number of
operators. The governing bodies of publicly owned or operated airports
shall grant exclusive or limited agreements to displace business competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly service whenever the governing body de-
termines, in consideration of the factors set forth [elsewhere in this
article] that such agreements are necessary to further the policies and to
fulfill the objectives stated in this article. The Legislature contemplates
that publicly owned or operated airports will grant exclusive or limited
agreements in furtherance of the policy of this state to displace business
competition by exclusive or limited agreements to fulfill these policies and
objectives. 140
Before deciding to displace competition, the airport board must,
"under authority. . . expressly delegated by the state, determine
the necessity for an exclusive or limited agreement."141 Particu-
lar determinations must be made with the policy objectives of the
act in mind.142
Thus, the airport law contains no express requirement that
competition be displaced. Further, no means are provided for any
type of state supervision in an active sense.' 43 While the act ex-
140. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21690.8 (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). The
"factors" to be considered by the public airport in deciding to displace competition
are set forth in the text. See infra note 143 and accompanying text; CAL. PUB. UTI.
CODE § 21690.5(d) (West Supp. 1983) reads: 'The policy of this state is to promote
the development of commerce and tourism to the end of securing to the people of
this state the benefits of these activities conducted in the state." Id.
The authority to displace competition is broad, extending to agreements "in con-
nection with the management of any airport facility or operation of any airport
concession." Id. at § 21690.9.
141. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21690.9 (West Supp. 1983).
142. Id. In particular the airport may consider:.
(a) Public safety.
(b) Public convenience.
(c) Quality of service.
(d) The need to conserve airport space.
(e) The need to avoid duplication of services.
(f) The impact on the environment or facilities of the airport as an essential
commercial and tourist service center.
(g) The need to avoid destructive competition which may impair the quality of
airport services to the public, lead to uncertainty, disruption, or instability
in the rendering of such services, or detract from the state's attractiveness
as a center of tourism and commerce.
The airport must still comply with state and local requirements for competitive
bidding. Id. at § 21690.10.
143. One could argue that the conduct of the board in deciding to displace com-
petition is subject to the supervision of the state's courts in that failure to make a
pressly declares that it is designed to meet the demands of Boul-
der, 144 it will fall short of its goal if either state compulsion or
active state supervision is required.
The acts under consideration by the California legislature con-
cern taxi cab regulation and the provision of emergency medical
services. The taxi bill takes an approach similar to the enacted
airport law. The municipality is not required to displace competi-
tion and no means are provided for state supervision.145 All the
state subdivisions are required to do is to adopt "an ordinance or
resolution in regard to taxi cab transportation service . . . [pro-
viding] a policy for entry into the business [and] ... It] he estab-
lishment or registration of rates .... -146 No pervasive
displacement of competition would be required, but it is ex-
pressly contemplated.147 Thus, the taxi bill carries the same po-
tential problems found in the airport act.' 48
The remaining California measure died in the Assembly, but is
reviewed nonetheless as an interesting approach to immunizing
legislation. 49 For a number of years, the state's Emergency Med-
ical Services Authority has served as a sort of master state orga-
nizer for crisis health care. The actual planning was left to local
governmental units with the Authority having the option to disap-
prove the plan if it failed to provide sufficient service. 150 Thus, a
sort of Midcal/Cantor situation exists, the important difference
reasonable decision would be subject to some sort of extraordinary preemptive
writ.
144., The Legislative Counsel's Digest notes:
Federal laws which prohibit monopolies and certain anticompetitive ac-
tivities are generally not applicable to the state in its sovereign capacity,
but are generally applicable to local governmental entities, except when
the local governmental agency engages in monopolistic or anticompetitive
activity on behalf of the state in accordance with criteria established by
the courts.
1982 Cal. Stat. Ch. 767. In justifying the measure as an "urgency statute," the legis-
lature declared:
In view of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, . . . uncertainty presently
exists as to whether the practices of publicly owned or operated airports,
in contracting to have vital public services rendered through limited or ex-
clusive concession agreements, may contravene federal statutes which
prohibit contracts in restraint of trade or commerce. In order that airport
authorities may continue to provide such services in the most efficient and
least costly manner, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.
Id. at Legislative Counsel's Digest section 3.
145. Cal. S.B. 944, 1983-84 Session (1983).
146. Id. at § 2 (emphasis added).
147. While the municipalities must set an entry policy and at least register
rates, they are not limited to those acts alone. Id. at § 2.
148. The bill "died" January 30, 1984 pursuant to CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a).
See Cal. Senate Weekly History, Feb. 2, 1984, at 540.
149. Cal. Assembly Weekly History, Feb. 2, 1984, at 84.
150. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1797.108 (West 1982).
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being that the actor whose conduct is "merely approved" by the
state is a governmental subdivision rather than a private party.
The potential for antitrust liability seems clear to California's
legislature. Presently, the emergency medical services bill (EMS
bill) observes:
It is the intent of the Legislature in amending .. and adding . the
Health and Safety Code... to prescribe and exercise the degree of state
direction and supervision over the emergency and nonemergency medical
services affected by this act, as will preclude the incurrence of liability
under federal antitrust laws for activities undertaken by local governmen-
tal entities in carrying out their prescribed functions .... 151
The bill does not require counties to displace competition, but
does provide a means for Authority (state agency) review of the
emergency medical services plan on a yearly basis:
(a) Local EMS agencies shall annually submit an emergency medical
services plan for the EMS area to the affected health systems agency and
the authority. The emergency medical services plan may divide the EMS
area into subareas or zones and may designate exclusive providers of non-
emergency and emergency medical services within the EMS area, subarea,
or zone.
(b) The health systems agency shall have 60 days to make recommen-
dations and may request modification of the plan if the plan is not deemed
to be in the interest of the consumers to be served, or is not consistent
with the overall plan for health care delivery.
(c) If a plan designates one or more exclusive providers, the authority
shall review such exclusive provider designation and, unless the authority
notifies the local agency within 60 days that such exclusive designation is
deemed not to be in the interest of the consumers to be served, the exclu-
sive designation shall be implemented and shall for all purposes be
deemed an action proposed and implemented at the direction of the state
acting as sovereign. 15 2
The EMS bill presented a situation not yet considered by the
courts; no state compulsion, but active state supervision.153
3.2.2 Colorado
For obvious reasons, 5 4 the Boulder decision sparked an initial
scurry of activity in Colorado. Yet, the current stance of the state
151. Cal. A.B. 49, § 1, 1983-84 Regular Sess. (1983). See also Cal. A.B. 1908, 1983-
84 Regular Sess. (1983).
152. Id. at § 4 (some emphasis omitted).
153. The California Assembly is also considering a bill exempting joint re-
search activities from the proscriptions of the state antitrust laws. Cal. A.B. 326,
1983-84 Regular Sess. Similar legislation has been urged at the federal level. See
L.A. DAIy J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 6. California's antitrust laws do not apply to
restraints imposed by government. Widdows v. Koch, 263 Cal. App. 2d 228, 235, 69
Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1968). See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-758 (West 1964).
154. The city of Boulder is in Colorado.
seems to be that immunizing legislation is unneeded and undesir-
able. The Rocky Mountain State's first foray into post-Boulder
legislation was an omnibus bill that expressly authorized munici-
palities to "displace competition with regulation and to partake of
the exemption and immunity of the state."1 5 5 This approach
would clearly be subject to challenge on the language of Parker
itself: "[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it. . . ",156 This pro-
posal apparently died (or is still tied up) in the state legislature.
Colorado lawmakers next considered a bill designed to confer
immunity in the area of land use planning. The proposed legisla-
tion declared that it was state policy to "authorize local govern-
ments to displace competition with regulation in planning for or
regulating land use pursuant to the powers granted to local gov-
ernments [in the state's constitution or statutes]. In so doing, lo-
cal governments and their officers and employees shall partake of
the exemption and immunity of the state of Colorado from liabil-
ity under any antitrust law." 157
The unfortunate choice of the word "authorize" flares in sug-
gesting that the proposal would, in direct contradiction to Parker,
merely "authorize" municipalities to violate the antitrust laws. 15 8
However, the language surely contemplates displacement of com-
petition. The bill also opens itself to antitrust attack by providing
that the decision to displace competition will be left to the munic-
ipalities1 59 and by providing no active means of state
supervision. 60
155. Civelletti, Antitrust or Anti-Cities? in ANTrrRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
181, 185 (J. Siena ed. 1983).
156. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. Such an approach is surely the most efficient way
to deal with the Boulder problem without displacing local control, yet its enact-
ment would surely be soon followed by a Boulder type challenge of its validity.
Civelletti, supra note 155, at 186.
157. Col. S.B. 211, 29-20.5-101, 54th Gen. Assembly, First Regular Sess. 1983 (em-
phasis added).
158. Parker, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). The attorney general's office recognized
this deficiency in its review of the legislation. "The bill's main problem is that it is
declaratory rather than operative in nature; it does not add anything to the land
use planning powers already possessed by local government." Memo from T. Mc-
Mahon & B. Morris, Assistant Attorneys General, to G. Smith, First Assistant At-
torney General, Feb. 24, 1983 [hereinafter cited as "Colorado Zoning Memo"].
159. The bill provided:
When acting to displace competition with regulation in planning for or
regulating land use as authorized by the Colorado constitution or statutes,
each local government shall proceed according to the judgment of its gov-
erning body, authorized boards and commissions, or electors as to the
type and degree of regulatory activity deemed to be in the best interest of
its citizens.
Col. S.B. 211, 29-20.5-103, 54th Gen. Assembly, First Reg. Sess. (1983).
160. Rather, the bill provided for a sort of passive supervision by mechanisms
already in place:
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In its review of the proposed legislation, the State Attorney
General's Office questioned the bill not only as to its obvious con-
flicts with Parker Doctrine, but as to its service of any purpose:
[The bill] simply does not make good sense from a policy perspective.
There is no real likelihood that local governmental units will actually be
subjected to any significant amount of antitrust litigation as a result of
their land use planning decisions. During the four years between the
Supreme Court decisions in Lafayette and Boulder, only 5 reported deci-
sions out of the 6,000 antitrust cases filed have involved the question of an-
titrust liability of local governmental units for land use planning. 16 1
Even before the zoning bill was considered, the Senate Com-
mittee on Local Government had concluded that immunizing stat-
utes in general were likely to be unwise from a public policy point
of view.
The antitrust laws establish a national policy favoring free competition
in the market place [and] . . . [aipplication of the . . . laws to political
subdivisions can be viewed as a step in furtherance of national policy.
A legislative grant of immunity could act to protect abuses by public
officials.
Recourse to suit under the federal antitrust laws provides [a] reason-
able and necessary mechanism . . .to compensate . . . for the damage
caused by ... unreasonable conduct [of] local officials.
[Therefore,] legislation immunizing local government entities from
[antitrust liability] is not advisable. 16 2
3.2.3 Florida
While Florida has considered no legislation in response to Boul-
Sufficient state supervision of local government land use planning and
regulation shall be provided by the availability of judicial review, the
availability of initiative and referendum, the availability of election and re-
call, the authority of the general assembly to enact and amend statutes,
the authority of the people of Colorado to amend the Colorado constitu-
tion, and the continuing administrative structure and quasi-judicial proce-
dures available by statute, charter, ordinance, or resolution to implement
and review local government land use planning and regulatory activities.
Id. at 29-20.5-104. The zoning bill would also have required the filing of land use
regulations with the state in order to "further ensure an effective state ability to
supervise ... " Id. at 29-20.5-104.
161. Colorado Zoning Memo, supra note 158, at 3.
162. Draft Report, Col. Sen. Comm. on Local Gov., Sept. 14, 1982, at 9-13.
Colorado's state antitrust laws provide an express exemption for price discrimi-
nation as to region by publicly regulated utlities. Col. Rev. Stat. § 6-2-103(2)
(1974). This exemption does not extend to contracts that otherwise restrain trade.
Laitos and Feverstein, May Regulated Utilities Monopolize the Sum, 56 DEN. L. J.
31, 59-60 (1979). See generally Ducker, Antitrust and the Lay Lawyer, 44 DEN. L. J.
558 (1967).
der, the Attorney General's Department of Legal Affairs has con-
sidered the matter.
Though local government antitrust is a rapidly evolving area and our anal-
ysis is, therefore, preliminary, a number of points have emerged:
(1) proposals for legislation amending the federal antitrust laws to pro-
vide blanket immunity for municipal anticompetitive activity are
probably both unnecessary and undesirable.
First, blanket immunity for municipalities would mean that all munici-
pal anticompetitive activity would be protected even if it did not further
any valid public interest and even if it was unnecessarily injurious to
competition.
Second, proponents of such an amendment may find their goal difficult
to achieve because of the fundamental role played by the antitrust laws in
our society and a strong legislative presumption in favor of competition.
(2) Critics of the Boulder case may have overstated its threat to local
governments.
Lower court cases such as Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 1983-1
(CCH) Tr. Cas., 65,227, indicate that local government immunity is avail-
able when necessary.
16 3
The Attorney General's office also suggests that if use of the
federal laws to meet this pro-competitive goal proves too un-
wieldy, state antitrust laws could be applied to reach the same re-
sult. 6 4 Florida's state antitrust laws provide no exemption for
municipal activity.165
3.2.4 Illinois
Illinois is presently considering a "we dub thee immune" ap-
proach to dealing with Boulder. The proposed amendment to the
state's antitrust act declares that, as a matter of "state policy,"
units of local government may displace competition, "to the ex-
tent that they exercise any power conferred by the laws and regu-
lations of the state . .. "166 No mechanism for active state
supervision is provided, however, the bill suggests that "active"
163. Letter from R. Bellack, Assistant Attorney General, to M. Parrish (June 30,
1983).
164. Id. at 2.
165. See A.B.A. SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST LAws 9-8 (1973).
166. Ill. H.B. 1208, § 12, 83rd Gen. Assembly (1983) (as amended). It is not en-
tirely clear that the proposed legislation is intended to operate on the federal
level. An amendment to the bill provides: "For purposes of this section, the courts
of this State in construing this Act shall not follow the construction given to the
Federal law by the Federal Courts." Ill. H.B. 1208, § 12, 83rd Gen. Assembly (1983)
(as amended). This appears aimed at the construction provision of the state act:
"When the language of this Act is the same or similar to the language of a Federal
Anti-trust Law, the courts of this state in construing this Act shall follow the con-
struction given to the Federal Law by the Federal Courts." Ill. Rev Stat. ch. 38
§ 60-11 (1977). However, the language of the statute seems just as clearly aimed at
providing immunity on the federal level. The state antitrust laws provide exemp-
tions for various activities including the operation of regulated public utilities. Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 60-5(3) (1977). As to exemptions from the state laws in general,
see A.B.A. Section on Antitrust Law, supra note 200, at 13-7-8.
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supervision will be accomplished on the local level.167 The deci-
sion to displace competition is left to the municipality as well.168
To the extent the bill purports to protect against liability, it would
likely be of little, if any, substantive value.169
3.2.5 Maine
Maine has avoided a broad Boulder immunity bill in favor of at-
tention to problem areas one at a time. The sole area considered
to date involves solid waste disposal.170 The thrust of the pro-
posed bill is enabling municipalities to dispose of waste using en-
ergy recovery techniques. This method is only effective if a
steady stream of waste is available, hence, the bill empowers mu-
nicipalities to require that all community solid waste be disposed
of at a particular site for use in an energy recovery plant.' 7 '
Although the proposed legislation literally purports to author-
167. As in Colorado and California, the only state supervision posited is pas-
sive. Ill. H.B. 1208, § 12, 83rd Gen. Assembly (1983) (as amended). This arguably
fails the Midcal requirement in that it is not state supervision.
168. Id.
169. The bill is a broad "authorization" statute that leaves the decision to dis-
place competition up to the municipality and provides no active state supervision.
It seems unlikely that the court would allow slack sufficient to let each of these
apparent problems pass muster. Id.
170. Maine H.P. 1048, L.D. 1392, llth Legislature, 1st Reg. Sess. (1983). The bill
would amend ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 38, § 1304 (Supp. 1983).
171. The Statement of Fact accompanying the bill explains the concept and re-
quirements of energy recovery from solid waste:
Energy recovery is the extraction and use of energy from solid waste.
There are a number of ways to extract this energy, but the most common
method is incinerating solid waste to produce hot water or steam. The hot
water or steam is then sold to offset the cost of incineration.
Energy recovery technology is complex and the equipment requires a
steady supply of waste to operate efficiently. Because of the complicated
technology, energy recovery facilities have high capital costs and long
payback periods. In order to remain cost-effective throughout their lives,
energy recovery facilities usually enter long-term agreements with waste
suppliers in order to guarantee that they have a steady supply of waste. In
most cases, these waste suppliers are municipalities.
In order to guarantee a steady waste supply, most energy recovery facil-
ities require participating municipalities to enter long-term agreements to
deliver a minimum amount of waste to the facility or pay a penalty if in-
sufficient waste is delivered. This type of agreement is known as a "put or
pay" contract. The municipality must deliver the waste, or pay for it any-
way. In order to meet their contractual obligations, most of these munici-
palities pass ordinances requiring waste generated within the
municipality to be delivered to the facility with whom the municipality
has a contract.
Maine H.P. 1048, L.D. 1392, p.3-4, l11th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1983).
ize municipalities to run astray of antitrust norms, a careful read-
ing of the bill in context with the state's overall plan for waste
management reveals that it likely meets the requirements of
Boulder. The bill expressly sets forth "state policy" encouraging
the use of energy recovery plants for waste disposal172 and "con-
templates" 7 3 that making such facilities feasible may require dis-
placement of competition. Existing legislation already provides a
sort of active state supervision of municipal solid waste manage-
ment plans.1 74 Assuming that state contemplation of displace-
ment is sufficient to meet Boulder's requirements, the bill
demonstrates that Boulder concerns are subject to resolution
without substantial initial intrusion into local government. 175
3.2.6 Maryland
Maryland's consideration of Boulder's impact is the most exten-
172. The bill declares that its purpose is "to promote energy recovery and au-
thorizing municipalities to guarantee delivery of their solid waste to specific waste
facilities." Id. at 4.
173. Whether merely "contemplating" displacement (as opposed to requiring
it) is insufficient is still debated. If contemplation is sufficient, the bill surely
passes muster
Because of the complicated technology, most energy recovery facilities
have high capital costs and long payback periods. In order to remain cost-
effective throughout their lives, energy recovery facilities require a guar-
anteed, steady supply of waste. Consequently, municipalities utilizing en-
ergy recovery facilities are usually required to enter long-term agreements
to provide the facilities with specific amounts of waste. In order to make
these energy recovery facilities financially feasible, and thereby simulta-
neously improve the environmental impacts and the economics of munici-
pal solid waste disposal, municipalities shall have the legal authority to
control the handling of solid waste generated within their borders.
Id. The legislature's Statement of Fact notes:
Municipalities need the express authority to enforce this type of ordi-
nance. Recent federal court decisions, . . . indicate that a state legislature
must "clearly articulate and affirmatively express" a policy to promote en-
ergy recovery and authorize municipalities to control their solid waste
flow before these ordinances can withstand judicial scrutiny. This bill es-
tablishes that policy and affirms that authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. See MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 38, § 1304(3), § 1305(4) (1978). Municipal
plans are sent to the State Board of Environment Protection. The Board may pro-
mulgate regulations based, in part, upon such reports. In making its decisions, the
State Board is required to consider a variety of factors, including economic impact.
Presumably, the Board could determine that a decision to displace competition
was imprudent and take corrective measures by means of regulation.
175. While every municipality is required to make solid waste management and
status reports and to provide some means for local solid waste disposal, the ulti-
mate decisions of how, what and where are initially left to local government. The
Waste bill is not the sole piece of Maine proposed legislation taking Boulder to
heart. The decision was also considered in drafting a white water rafting zone law.
Maine S.P. 625, L.D. 1763, llth Leg. 1st Reg. Sess. (1983). The authority to zone
rivers for rafting use was granted with the understanding that competition might
be displaced, however, the acting entity is a state agency, not a state subdivision.
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sive of any state to date. In July of 1982, Governor Hughes formed
a task force "with the responsibility for identifying those areas of
local government operations which are most subject to antitrust
scrutiny and for recommending legislation to preserve, as much
as practicable, the 'state action' defense in those areas where it is
needed and appropriate."176 After studying the matter for six
months,177 the task force submitted its report to the governor. 178
In determining whether protective legislation was "appropriate,"
the task force examined the gravity of state policy promoted by
the local acts in question. 79 Next, the task force examined
whether the state subdivisions to be protected were "politically
visible in a high degree" and "subject to political control."180
The report concluded that legislation was needed in a number
of areas and might be desirable in others. Specifically, the report
suggested legislation to protect state subdivision activities in:
(1) zoning;18 1
(2) solid waste disposal; 182
(3) ambulance, hospital and health care;183
(4) public transportation;18 4
176. Letter from Maryland Governor Harry Hughes to George Lieberman, Esq.
(July 28, 1982) (establishing the Governor's Task Force to Study Local Govern-
ment Antitrust Liability).
177. The task force held "work sessions" open to the public and conducted a
public hearing. Testimony and written materials were accepted from a number of
interested persons. Report of the Governor's Task Force on Local Government
Antitrust Liability 1-2 (Feb. 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as "Task Force Report"].
178. Id.
179. This step seems implicit in the Task Force Report. See, e.g., Task Force
Report, supra note 177, at 13. "[R]egulation of the waste stream is basic to the
planning of new solid waste disposal plants.
180. See, e.g., id. at 15.
181. Id. at 12-13. The report recommended amendment of the existing regula-
tory scheme to make it clear that the authority to zone was granted with the un-
derstanding that competition might be displaced.
182. Id. at 13-14. The concern in this area is similar to that in Maine and flows
from the Supreme Court's decision in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,
455 U.S. 931 (1982) (reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boul-
der); see 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding solid waste regulations immune
from antitrust scrutiny under Parker).
183. Task Force Report, supra note 177, at 14.
In Maryland there has been significant political and judicial scrutiny of ar-
rangements in this area. In the view of the Task Force, no benefit would
be derived from the subjection of practices of public hospitals with regard
to health care providers to whatever federal antitrust controls may exist.
Id.
184. Id. at 15. The report advised that either a statewide licensing system could
be implemented, or the laws granting local political power could be amended "to
(5) water and sewer service; 18 5
(6) towing service; 1 86
(7) concessions and leases;18 7
(8) urban development; 18 8
(9) alcoholic beverages;18 9
(10) soil conservation; 19 0
(11) mixed income housing;1 9 1 and
(12) industrial development. 1 9 2
The task force advised the legislature that before adopting the re-
port's proposals, it "should separately consider the competitive
impact of each power granted."19 3 So are the seeds of "state con-
templation" sown.
In April of 1983, the Maryland Legislature enacted a package of
bills closely resembling those proposed by the task force.194 Also
adopted was the report's recommendation that the state attorney
general be authorized to defend municipalities against antitrust
restrict municipal discretion in adopting particular types of franchise agree-
ments." Id.
185. Id. at 16. The report notes that this is an area of vigorous litigation. See
Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981); Gas and
Electric Co. v. Sacramento Public Utility District, 526 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Cal. 1981);
Schrader v. Horton, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (W.D. Va. 1979); City of Mishawaka v. Ameri-
can Electric Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
186. Task Force Report, supra note 177, at 16.
187. Id. at 16-17. This too is a much litigated area. See Pueblo Aircraft Service
v. City of Pueblo, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,668 (10th Cir. 1982); Corey v. Look,
641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway, 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1977), original judgment reinstated, 583 F.2d
378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1978); Duke and Company v. Foers-
ter, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Guthrie v. Genesee County, 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Pinehurst Air-
lines, Inc. v. Resort Air Services, 476 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.N.C 1979).
188. Task Force Report, supra note 177, at 17. The task force expressed concern
about Baltimore's special redevelopment plans.
189. Id. at 17-18. Alcoholic beverages are subject to extensive regulation.
190. Id. at 18-19. Although the state's soil conservation districts are largely
state funded (as opposed to municipally funded), the report notes that they are a
special prospect for antitrust liability because they provide goods and services
available in the private sector.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id. at 19-20.
193. Id. at 12.
194. Md. S.B. 770 (1983) to be codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2A (Supp.
1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25, § 3D (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5A
(Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25B, § 13B (Supp. 1984); Charter of Baltimore
City Art. II § 57 (Supp. 1984). Md. S.B. 629 (1983) to be codified at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23A, § 2(34) (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(X) (Supp. 1984); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 2.01 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66B, § 4.01(d) (Supp.
1984). Md. S.B. 635 (1983) to be codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 1 (Supp. 1984);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266B(1) (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266C(f)
and (1) (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A, §§ 2, 8A, 8B, 8C, 8D (Supp. 1984);
MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-102(e), 8-306(a) (20)-(21) (Supp. 1984); MD. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 8-306(a)(17), (18), (19) (Supp. 1984).
All of the above measures became effective July 1, 1983.
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claims.195 Each attempt to cloak subdivisions with antitrust im-
munity is accompanied by a thorough statement of state policy
and plans in a specific area that expressly recognizes that, in sat-
isfying the mandates of the legislative decree, municipalities may
need to displace competition. The zoning enactment is
representative:
(I) It has been and shall continue to be the policy of this state that the
orderly development and use of land and structures requires comprehen-
sive regulation through implementation of planning and zoning controls.
(II) It has been and shall continue to be the policy of this state that
planning and zoning controls shall be implemented by local government.
(III) To achieve the public purpose of this regulatory scheme, the gen-
eral assembly recognizes that local government action will ... displace or
limit economic competition by owners and users of property.
(IV) It is the policy of the general assembly and of this state that com-
petition and enterprise shall be so displaced or limited for the attainment
of the purposes of the state policy for implementing planning and zoning
controls as set forth in this article and elsewhere in the public local and
public general law.19 6
Each extension of immunity is tempered with specific
limitations:
(V) The powers granted to the municipality pursuant to this subsection
shall not be construed:
(1) To grant to the municipality powers in any substantive area not
otherwise granted to the municipality by other public general or public lo-
cal law;
(2) To restrict the municipality from exercising any power granted
to the municipality by other public general or public local law or
otherwise;
(3) To authorize the municipality or its officers to engage in any ac-
tivity which is beyond their power under other public general law, public
local law, or otherwise; or
(4) To preempt or supersede the regulatory authority of any state
department or agency under any public general law.
19 7
Because all of the new laws leave the ultimate decision to dis-
place competition up to state subdivisions, they will not serve
their purpose if state compulsion is eventually found to be neces-
sary. However, the laws strike an interesting compromise be-
tween express compulsion and the municipal choice. The
subdivision is not required to displace competition, however, it is
195. Md. S.B. 645 (1983) to be codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 12J (Supp.
1984). This bill also became effective July 1, 1983.
196. Md. S.B. 629, § 1 (1983) to be codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2(34)
(Supp. 1984).
197. Id. (emphasis omitted).
required to regulate in a manner that the state recognizes may re-
quire that competition be displaced.
None of the bills provide for active state supervision. The task
force's initial selection of areas to protect included a finding that
the areas were to be "politically visible and subject to political
control,"198 however, such supervision is arguably passive. It is
unclear whether the legislature or governor adopted the task
force recommendation so that some group would be organized to
review municipal conduct impacting competition.199
All in all, it appears that Maryland's efforts will likely be suc-
cessful. The shotgun "we dub thee immune" approach is avoided
in favor of reasoned analysis in particular areas. Although dis-
placement is not required, other conduct that may require dis-
placement is. This allows for maximum local control with clear
state contemplation of possible displacement. Last, the provi-
sions extend the antitrust shield in areas subject to high visibility,
and political control.
3.2.7 Nevada
Nevada is in the initial stages of considering Boulder's impact.
Because some Nevada municipalities "have levied franchise and
license fees on business enterprises or imposed controls over
their activities in a manner which would not meet the require-
ments 200 for exemption from federal antitrust laws," 20 ' the State
Assembly directed the state legislative commission to:
(1) Study the effect of the federal antitrust laws on licensing of busi-
nesses by local governments;
(2) Examine the activities of local government to determine which do not
constitute state action as described in the Boulder case and are there-
fore subject to scrutiny by the courts for compliance with the federal
antitrust laws; and
(3) Examine the relevant state laws and submit recommendations for any
new legislation or amendments needed to protect the local govern-
ments from potential liability under federal antitrust laws.2 0 2
If the state senate adopts the resolution, the report will be due at
the 63rd session of the Nevada legislature. 20 3
198. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
199. This appears to have been a "let's be safe" recommendation for it is ap-
pended to the report's conclusion that "[n]o such [active supervision] require-
ment ... has been imposed as a condition of municipal immunity by the federal
cases." Task Force Report, supra note 177, at 21. Whether this conclusion is accu-
rate is far from certain.
200. It is probably more accurate to say that the conduct is undertaken without
sufficient state direction and supervision to satisfy Parker as applied in Boulder.
201. Nev. A.C.R. 18, 1, 62nd Leg. (1983).
202. Id. at 2.
203. The resolution was referred to the Senate on April 25, 1983.
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3.2.8 New York
While New York has enacted no legislation directly in response
to Boulder, the state's "model" resource recovery act (drafted
before Boulder) reflects a subtle awareness of the pre-Boulder
Parker Doctrine case law.204 The act, in effect, sets up a resource
recovery agency for a particular county. Since Boulder, the state
has enacted similar legislation to create resource recovery agen-
cies for other communities. 205 Each of the laws in turn provides
that municipalities within the agencies' area may enact legislation
regulating the disposal of solid waste. 206
To further the governmental and public purposes of the agency including
the implementation of any contract or proposed contract contemplated by
this title, the county and all other municipalities within the county shall
have power to adopt and amend local laws imposing appropriate and rea-
sonable limitations on competition, including, without limiting the gener-
ality of the foregoing, as to the municipalities within the county local laws
requiring that all solid waste generated or originating within their respec-
tive boundaries, subject to such exceptions as may be determined to be in
the public interest, shall be delivered to a specified solid waste manage-
ment-resource facility; provided, however, that the county shall not be em-
powered under this section to adopt any such local law requiring the
delivery of solid waste to a specified solid waste management-resource re-
covery facility. 2 0 7
The law also declares that agencies and municipalities acting
pursuant to its provisions are acting in a governmental capac-
ity.2 0 8 While the ordinances enacted by municipalities are subject
to preemption by the agencies' promulgation of regulations, there
is no means provided for active state supervision. Further, the
decision to displace competition is left entirely to the municipal-
ity. These flaws surely are not fatal to the Act's viability under
Boulder. The Act is strong in expressing state policy contemplat-
ing displacement of competition and the necessity of state com-
pulsion and supervision (as noted many times above) has yet to
be firmly established.
3.2.9 North Carolina
North Carolina has enacted one bill that specifically takes ac-
204. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 2045-a - -x (McKinney Supp. 1983).
205. See, e.g., id. at §§ 2046-a - -u.
206. See id. at § 2045-t(2).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 2045-t (McKinney Supp. 1983). This likely reflects
the distinction between proprietary and non-proprietary municipal conduct al-
luded to in Lafayette.
count of Boulder. The broad purpose of the law was to establish
the North Carolina Energy Development Authority.20 9 In order to
insure the success of the Authority, the law provides that munici-
palities contracting with the Authority may be compelled by the
Authority to ordinances controlling waste disposal.
The Authority ... shall have ... the following powers:
(7) [TJhe power to compel any participating municipality to adopt and
enforce an ordinance, which plan or ordinance shall provide that any or all
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the participating party shall use the
services and facilities of the Authority for solid waste management;
(8) The power and obligation to review and actively supervise the en-
forcement of such solid waste plans or ordinances, when adopted in con-
junction with a project.2 10
Thus, the Authority, which is in effect a state administrative
agency, may compel municipalities to displace competition pursu-
ant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy to so act. Continuing agency supervision is also expressly
provided. The terms of Boulder are clearly met.21 '
3.2.10 North Dakota
North Dakota has taken the shotgun approach to antitrust im-
munity. The state's emerging law (effective March 10, 1983) suc-
cinctly provides:
All immunity of the state from provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act
... is hereby extended to any city or city governing body acting within
the scope of the grants of authority contained in sections [enumerating
state subdivision powers]. When acting within the scope of the grants of
authority contained in [the] sections, . . . a city or city governing body
shall be presumed to be acting in furtherance of state policy.2 12
The flaws in the measure are fairly obvious if a strict reading of
209. 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 131, ch. 652, to be codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159F-
1-9 (Supp. 1984).
210. Id. at 136 (emphasis supplied), to be codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159F-
5(a) (7), (8) (Supp. 1984). This provides means to soften the impact of such ordi-
nances on private industry:
[Ihf a private solid waste landfill shall be substantially affected by such
plan or ordinance then the unit of local government compelled to adopt
the plan or ordinance shall be required to give the operator of the affected
landfill at least 2 years' written notice prior to the effective date of the pro-
posed plan or ordinance.
Id.
211. The act also provides that other "necessary" ordinances may be adopted.
"When a municipality enters into a joint venture or contract with the Authority,
that municipality shall also have the power to adopt, at the direction and supervi-
sion of the Authority, solid waste ordinances necessary to effectuate the purpose
of this Chapter .... " Id. at 138, to be codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159F-7(c)
(Supp. 1984).
212. N.D.H.B. 1064, § 1, 48th Leg. Assembly (1983). State subdivision powers are
enumerated at N.D. CENrT. CODE §§ 40-05-01, 40-05-02 and 40-05.1-06 (Supp. 1981).
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the Parker Doctrine is applied.213 It would be an uphill argument
to suggest that the legislature contemplated every anticompetitive
effect the bill purports to immunize. The statutes referenced in
the law cover 108 general headings ranging from the authority to
operate public restrooms to the power to enact zoning
ordinances. 2 14
The effort may prove effective, however, for there is a substan-
tial difference between the broad grant of power under a home
rule provision and the broad but specifically defined grant made
in North Dakota's municipal law. The obvious result of the state's
tack is the absence of intrusion on municipal control.
3.2.11 Tennessee
Tennessee's post-Boulder legislation addressed the now famil-
iar subject of solid waste disposal. 215 The solid waste disposal
plan contemplates that various subdivisions will build and oper-
ate disposal facilities drawing raw waste product from themselves
and surrounding communities. 216 In contrast to some state
schemes, the operating authority is thus not a state agency. 217
Effective May 5, 1983, the modifications to the state's waste act
express the legislature's understanding that in order to meet the
act's goals, subdivisions may need to displace competition.
In connection with the construction, financing, operation or maintenance
of an energy production facility under the provisions of this chapter, a mu-
nicipality other than a power district is authorized to exercise exclusive
jursidiction [sic] and exclusive right to control the collection and disposal
of solid waste within its boundaries, and in furtherance of the energy and
environmental objectives of this Act, and the Tennessee Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act, to take all necessary and proper actions which displace competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service. Any county which
213. Aside from the difficulties mentioned in the text infra, the bill clearly pro-
vides no active state supervision and does not compel the displacement of
competition.
214. See supra note 212.
215. Despite its familiar theme, the bill makes some interesting observations.
The legislative findings of fact note that one not so obvious result of Boulder is
difficulty in selling bonds to projects that may find themselves subject to antitrust
liability. Tenn. S.B. 860, H.B. 864 (1983).
The Senate made express reference to Boulder citing "municipal action in fur-
therance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
stated policy... "Id.
216. 1983 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 226 (1983) to be codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-
54-103(d) (Supp. 1984).
217. For example, the entity operating energy plants in North Carolina is a
state agency. See supra notes 245-51.
contracts with a municipality in connection with such municipality's con-
struction, operation or maintenance of an energy production facility is au-
thorized to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive right to control
the collection and disposal of solid waste within that portion of the
county's boundaries not located within the corporate limits of a municipal-
ity, and in furtherance of the energy and environmental objectives of this
Act, and of the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Act, to take all necessary
and proper actions which displace competition with regulation or monop-
oly public service.2 1
8
Hence, there is no requirement that competition be displaced,
but, as noted many times before, such compulsion may be
unnecessary.
The statutory scheme is strengthened substantially by its re-
quirement of active state supervision.
(a) Any municipality .... and any county which, as a part of the con-
struction, financing, operation or maintenance of an energy produc-
tion facility under the provisions of this Act, or of an energy recovery
facility or resource recovery facility . . . or of a solid waste disposal
system . . . proposes to displace competition with regulation or mo-
nopoly public service shall file with the Tennessee Department of
Public Health a certified copy of its proposed ordinance or resolution
and of the plans for the construction, financing, operation and mainte-
nance of the proposed project, not less than sixty (60) days before the
ordinance or resolution becomes effective.
(b) The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Public Health or
his authorized representative shall review such implementing ordi-
nance or resolution and such plans, and, based solely upon the record
before the municipality or before the county, determine, in his discre-
tion, whether they are reasonably necessary in order to achieve the
energy and environmental policy objectives of this Act and of Title 53,
Tennessee Code Annotated. 2 1 9
This strikes an interesting balance between ongoing active su-
pervision and mere passive political judicial supervision. The de-
cision to displace competition is actively supervised by the state
much as in Parker. 220 The continued desirability of such displace-
ment is left to passive political supervision, provided that the
state review is meaningful. This provides an effective method of
policing against favoritism in local politics while minimizing state
intrusion into ostensibly local affairs.
3.2.12 Utah
Utah has considered no post-Boulder legislation. The attorney
general's office opines that the state's constitutional and statu-
tory221 policy will preclude such legislation in all areas but "es-
218. 1983 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 226 (1983) to be codified as TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-
54-103(d) (Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
219. Id., to be amended to TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-54.
220. The regulatory scheme in Parker was tripped into action at the request of
those to be regulated by the state. In Tennessee, the "request" for regulation
amounts to the enactment of an ordinance that the state may accept or reject.
221. The state constitution expressly prohibits price fixing, while the state's an-
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sential governmental functions." Accordingly, the attorney
general's antitrust compliance education program assumes that
immunizing legislation will be available only for such activities.
Meantime, a number of Utah cities have petitioned the federal
legislature for some sort of federal exemption of municipal
conduct. 2 2 2
3.2.13 Virginia
Virginia is taking the piecemeal approach to Boulder. To date,
the legislature has addressed two areas. The first was cable tele-
vision; the second, taxi cabs.223
When the Supreme Court decided Boulder, Fairfax County, Vir-
ginia was in the process of making a cable franchise award. The
County wrote the state attorney, noting that the state cable regu-
lation law was deficient by Boulder standards. The office agreed
and recommended legislation providing that subdivisions could
issue one cable franchise and, after a public hearing, could award
additional franchises if needed. The bill was amended to provide
that while acting pursuant to the statute, subdivisions could take
actions that would violate the antitrust laws.224 The amendment
was later deleted.225 The enacted bill mirrors the attorney gen-
eral's proposal.
The governing body of any county, city or town may grant a license or
franchise ... to no more than one community antenna television system.
... The governing body shall have the authority to award additional
licenses, franchises or certificates of public convenience as it deems ap-
propriate, if such governing body finds that the public welfare will be en-
hanced by such awards after a public hearing at which testimony is heard
concerning the economic consideration, the impact on private property
rights, the impact on public convenience, the public need and potential
benefit, and such other factors as are relevant. It may regulate such sys-
titrust laws require the state attorney general to advocate competition. See, e.g.,
UTAH CONST. art. XII, § 20; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-923 (Supp. 1983).
222. See Siena, A Proposed Federal Legislative Solution in ANTITRUST & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 198 (J. Siena ed. 1983).
223. VA. CODE § 15.1-23.1 (Supp. 1983) (cable policy); Va. H.B. 479, 1983 Sess.
(taxi cab policy).
224. Stitt, An Experience in Obtaining Immunizing Legislation, in ANTITRUST &
LocAL GOVERNMENT 90-91 (J. Siena ed. 1983).
225. Id. This was allegedly the result of cable interest lobbying. In any case, it
is questionable whether the amendment would achieve the desired result. Stand-
ing alone it is an authorization of the type prohibited by Parker. Read in context,
it is arguably state recognition that displacement may be necessary. Less trouble-
some language would be much more effective.
tems, including the establishment of fees and rates.. 226
The legislation's potential trouble areas are its lack of state com-
pulsion and supervision. 227
3.2.14 Washington
Washington has considered no legislation in direct response to
Boulder, however, one proposed bill touches upon the issue. The
legislation under consideration is part of a package of bills that
would amend various portions of the state's government tort
claims scheme. 228 The general plan is that government entities
may be liable in tort for activities "of a type performed not only
by the state and municipal corporations but also by persons and
corporations in the private sector."22 9 The act then sets out ex-
ceptions to this general rule. One exception provides that there is
no liability arising out of:
The issuance, conditional issuance, nonissuance, denial, suspension, or
revocation of any permit, license, franchise, certificate, order to desist, va-
riance approval, zoning, rezoning, or similar authorization .... 230
While such language may prove effective if a liberal reading of
Boulder is adopted, the cautious municipality will not invest
much reliance interest in the provision if it becomes law. The act,
read broadly, may contemplate subdivision action to displace
competition, however, there is minimal discussion of the state
policy served by the displacement. Further, the exemption cre-
ated would be broad in scope, a method that, as noted above,
speaks poorly for the legislatures actually contemplating displace-
ment in every effected area.
3.2.15 Wisconsin
No legislation has been considered in Wisconsin, however, at
least one city has petitioned the legislature to act in the area of
226. VA. CODE § 15.1-23.1 (Supp. 1983).
227. The state attorney general's office points to Town of Hallie, 700 F.2d 376
(7th Cir. 1983), in asserting that active state supervision and state compulsion are
not required. Letter from Craig T. Merritt to Kevin Boyle (May 5, 1983) (respond-
ing to Boulder legislation inquiry).
228. Wash. S.B. 4213, § 1 (1983).
229. Id.
230. Id. at § 2. The act also notes:
[Ilt is not the intent of the legislature to extend liability so that it limits
the effectiveness of the state and municipal corporations in providing
services and regulatory functions necessary for the public health, welfare,
and safety, It is specifically recognized that the threat of damage claims
against the state and municipal corporations based on land use and per-
mit decisions places detrimental constraints on the legitimate exercise of
police powers.
Id. at § 1 (emphasis added).
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cable regulation in particular and municipal conduct in general.23 1
CONCLUSION
The ultimate requirements of Parker as applied to municipali-
ties will (absent federal legislation) be determined by the
Supreme Court,232 however, it is notable that the majority of
states adopting post-Boulder legislation have avoided terms re-
quiring that competition be displaced and have provided for mini-
mal or no state supervision. Yet, nearly every scheme provides
some protective mechanism to foil anticompetitive favoritism.
This is consistent with the argument that the gist of the Parker
cases is that the state controls the means whereby a non-state
party may decide to engage in conduct violative of the antitrust
laws. It is quite reasonable that the degree of this control varies
as to the public or private nature of the entity making the deci-
sion. Such an approach encourages careful consideration of state
decisions to extend its immunity with minimal state intrusion
into what are ultimately local affairs.233
The Boulder dissent's predictions of doom for municipal regula-
tion have proven overstated. Although localities are surely more
cautious in making such decisions, they are still being made and
litigation does not appear to be inevitable. In sum, the uncer-
tainty left by Boulder breeds a desirable result. No longer do lo-
cal governments acting to protect local (and sometimes
private/personal) concerns proceed without carefully considering
the consequences. In a country where pro-competitive enact-
ments have been equated to fundamental rights, such a result
seems very appropriate. 234
KEVIN CHARLES BOYLE
231. West Allis, Wisc. Res. 20625 (1982) (available from the Wisconsin Legisla-
tive Reference Bureau as document 352.12/2, Pos. t4).
232. The Court has before it a neatly packaged opportunity to declare whether
state compulsion and/or active state supervision is necessary in Town of Hallie v.
Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3070
(U.S. May 11, 1983) (No. 82-1382).
233. For other suggestions and theories on dealing with Boulder, see Bryant &
Bellak, A Proposal to Resolve Problems Resulting from Lafayette/Boulder Munici-
pal Antitrust Liability, 57 FLA. B.J. 482 (1983); Page, After Boulder: Some Practical
Advicefor Avoiding Antitrust Liability, 9 CURRENT MUN. PROB. 264 (1983); Brame
& Feller, Antitrust Liability of Local Governments: The Effect of City of Boulder, 9
VA. B.A.J. 14 (1983).
234. Epilogue: The Boulder case was settled in mid-1982. For its $200,000 plus
legal bill, Boulder got the cable company to promise to use best efforts to upgrade
the system to 35 channels in two years, two public access channels, a studio and a
remote van. For its part, the cable company got the city to "recognize its first
amendment rights," acknowledge the feasibility of cable competition and to agree
not to control programming, rates or the number of channels offered. Most impor-
tantly, the company's parent got to keep its multimillion dollar asset. KAGAN,
CABLE T.V. FRANCHISING, August 27, 1982, at 1.
